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AKHIL AMAR ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: "HERE I GO
DOWN THAT WRONG ROAD AGAIN"
DONALD DRIPps*

Constitutional criminalprocedure is in need of an overhaul.
It is replete with tenuous distinctionsand seemingly arbitrarylinedrawing. ProfessorAkhil Amar would remedy that uncertainty
with a unitary set of national rights fashioned through total
incorporation, but would limit the overall protections currently
afforded the criminally accused. ProfessorDonald Dripps agrees
that constitutionalcriminalprocedure needs change, but disagrees
with Amar's proposed means to that end. In this Article,
Professor Dripps critiques Amar's approach to constitutional
criminal procedure, and finds it historically and theoretically
barren. ProfessorDripps concludes by offering a different remedy
for the same ailment: due process of law.
In any given Term, criminal cases comprise about a fourth of the
Supreme Court's docket.' They account for a proportionate share of
the cases presenting constitutional questions.2 Typically, these
constitutional issues concern procedure rather than substance.
These facts might lead one to suppose that American
constitutional law is centrally preoccupied with criminal procedure.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In the criminal procedure
context, the Court rather openly decides cases with minimal respect
for doctrinal constraints. Even after vast expansions of federal
responsibility for criminal law enforcement, the great bulk of criminal
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. Thanks to Richard Aynes, Morgan Cloud,
Yale Kamisar, Wayne LaFave, Andy Leipold, and Bill Stuntz for their helpful comments
on a prior draft. Special thanks to Akhil Amar, who gave graciously and generously of
his time in commenting on an earlier draft. In a piece such as this one, the usual caveat
deserves unusual emphasis: Responsibility for the views expressed in this Article is solely
the author's.
1. See, e.g., The Supreme Court,1991 Term, Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163,
382-85, tbls. 2 & 3 (federal criminal cases, state criminal cases, and federal habeas corpus
cases accounted for 30 out of 134 cases disposed of by written opinion during 1991 term).
2. See id. (criminal cases accounted for 15 out of 44 cases presenting constitutional
questions that were resolved by written opinion).
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cases are prosecuted by state authorities.3 In this context, the central
constitutional principle is "fundamental fairness."'4 While fundamental fairness nominally incorporates most of the procedures set out in
the Bill of Rights, the Court has qualified those procedures according
to ad hoc balances of competing interests.5
As one might expect, "fundamental fairness," qualified by
interest-balancing, has generated an unprincipled and inconsistent
body of law. 6 The criminal procedure cases rarely acknowledge the
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1994, at 432 tbl. 5.5 & 485 tbl. 5.46 (1995) (U.S.
Attorneys' offices obtained 42,459 convictions in 1994, compared to 893,630 state court
convictions in 1992).
4. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
5. Compare, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. 145 (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in serious criminal cases) with Blanton
v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (rejecting right to jury trial in DUI
prosecution when maximum authorized sentence does not exceed six months incarceration); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates Sixth Amendment right to counsel and mandates appointed
counsel for indigent felony defendants in state courts) with United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648 (1984) (drawing no inference of ineffective assistance of counsel from fact that
defendant in complex mail fraud case was represented by young lawyer who had never
been involved in a jury trial and who was given only 25 days to prepare); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment incorporates both Fourth
Amendment rights and exclusionary remedy) with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) (admitting evidence seized under authority of warrant issued without probable
cause); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding confession obtained by custodial
interrogation absent warning and waiver inadmissible) with New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649 (1984) (holding no warning or waiver required where questioning may further public

safety).
For a recent example, see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995)
(upholding random urinalysis of public school athletes as not "unreasonable" under Fourth
Amendment).
6. Compare, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (approving resumption of
interrogation about another crime after suspect who had previously invoked Miranda right
to silence was given renewed warnings and validly waived the right) with Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding resumption of interrogation after suspect invokes
Mirandaright to counsel impermissible despite renewed warnings and purported waiver);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding post-arrest lineup to be a critical stage
of prosecution at which suspect has Sixth Amendment right to counsel) with Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding post-arrest but preindictment lineup not to be a
critical stage at which Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies); Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980) (holding that Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause requires government
to show unavailability of out-of-court declarant plus reliability of declarant's statements)
with United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (limiting Roberts by holding that Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause does not require unavailability analysis and that
reliability can be inferred from satisfaction of the traditional furtherance-of-conspiracy
hearsay exception); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding that due process
requires government to disprove provocation defense beyond reasonable doubt) with
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that due process does not require
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authority of anything but prior criminal procedure cases. Even this
currency is somewhat debased, for while overt overrulings are
infrequent, arbitrary distinctions abound.7 With isolated exceptions,'
the criminal procedure cases are a world unto themselves.
The academy has followed the Court and ratified this dissociation
of legal sensibility. Laurence Tribe's American Constitutional Law
makes three passing references to Miranda v. Arizona,9 and none to
Terry v. Ohio," in the course of more than seventeen hundred
pages." The leading criminal procedure casebook cites hundreds of
items from the academic literature, but neither Democracy and
Distrust2 nor Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw" makes
14
the list.

A great deal more is at stake than academic territoriality.
Constitutional criminal procedure cases are, after all, constitutional
cases. Their proper resolution demands consultation of those
considerations that inform constitutional law more generally-legitimacy, prudence, representation-reinforcement, and neutral
principles. In short, the Constitution needs to be put back into
criminal procedure.
Given this state of affairs, the recent entry into the criminal
the brilliant, quirky Yale
procedure field of Akhil Amar,
constitutionalist, is a signal development. In a series of recent articles,
Professor Amar has called for fundamental reconsideration of wellestablished constitutional doctrine regulating criminal procedure. In
his view, the central elements of Fourth Amendment doctrine-the
warrant requirement, the probable cause standard, and the
exclusionary remedy-should be abandoned.' Joined by coauthor
Renee Lettow, he argues that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against

government to disprove extreme emotional disturbance defense beyond reasonable doubt).
7. See supra notes 5 & 6.

8. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), for example, the Court relied heavily
on general equal protection precedents.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxxx, xcvi (2d ed.

1988).
12. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
13. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1959).
14. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE lxvii, lxxviii (8th ed.
1994).
15. See Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,107 HARV. L. REv. 757
(1994) [hereinafter Amar, FourthAmendment].
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self-incrimination forbids no more than introduction of compelled
testimony at the declarant's criminal trial. 6 The privilege, on their
account, imposes no limits on derivative use of compelled testimony. 7 The supporting arguments, with respect to both the Fourth
and the Fifth Amendments,
invoke "text, history, and plain old
18
common sense."
Professor Amar earlier published his conclusion that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges-or-Immunities Clause applies the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments against the states.' The supporting
argument places primary reliance on text and history. Although
Amar, together with coauthor Jonathan Marcus, has discussed due
process as an adjunct to the Double Jeopardy Clause, he has not
developed an account of due process in search-and-seizure or
interrogation cases.'
No restatement can do justice to a complex argument. No one
should read this essay who has not first carefully considered the
elegant and provocative papers by Amar and by Amar and Lettow.
Such readers will agree, I believe, that Amar's overall approach might

16. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment FirstPrinciples: The
Self-Incrimination Clause,93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995) [hereinafter Amar & Lettow, Fifth
Amendment].
17. Id.at 900-01.
18. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 757. In other articles, Professor
Amar has addressed the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause and the various
clauses of the Sixth Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double
Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995); Akhil Amar, Sixth
Amendment First Principles, GEO. L.J (forthcoming 1996). This article does not
specifically address double jeopardy, a subject of great difficulty but only modest practical
urgency. Nor does this article address the Sixth Amendment's trial provisions, as it was
completed before I was aware of Professor Amar's Sixth Amendment paper. It suffices
here to note that his views of the Sixth Amendment depend on the interpretive methods,
the incorporation thesis, and the disinterest in due process that underlie his Fourth and
Fifth Amendment views. See Amar, FourthAmendment, supra note 15; Amar & Lettow,
Fifth Amendment, supra note 16. The arguments developed here against that overall
approach apply as well against his Sixth Amendment claims.
19. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE
LJ.1193 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, FourteenthAmendment]. Although Amar qualifies his
incorporation thesis by distinguishing individual versus state collective rights, see id. at
1262-64, the criminal procedure guarantees appear to be individual in nature, even though
the Fourth Amendment refers to the "right of the people." Amar's "refined incorporation" is not invoked in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment articles. See Amar, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 15; Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16.
For a general rebuttal of Amar's Fourteenth Amendment views, see Raoul Berger,
Incorporationof the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar's Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1
(1993).
20. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 18, at 29, 31.
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be well-described as Fourteenth Amendment maximalism and Bill of
Rights minimalism. That is to say, he believes in a single, national set
of individual rights against criminal investigation and prosecution, but
he also believes that these rights permit the introduction of a great
deal more evidence against the criminal defendant than present law
permits. He believes, in short, that prevailing criminal procedure
doctrine is constitutionally upside-down.'
Given my belief that constitutional law and criminal procedure
stand to benefit from closer connections, I am naturally excited by
Professor Amar's recent work on criminal procedure. I am also
disappointed by it. At the level of theory, his vision depends on a
singularly unconvincing political account of the authoritative force of
text and history; it lacks a coherent account of the authoritative force
of precedent, and it lacks any account of the relation between
majoritarian politics and minority rights of the sort that might inform
the exercise of judicial review.
These issues may be so profoundly problematic that even the best
minds at work in the field of constitutional law cannot resolve them.
My disappointment may then more properly be directed at the human
condition than at Professor Amar. But then it becomes fully
competent to observe that if Professor Amar's approach is problematic as a matter of constitutional law, it would be unequivocally
pernicious as criminal procedure.
As a positive or descriptive matter, the Ainar approach is
fundamentally (and most ironically) ahistorical. For those seeking to
understand how criminal procedure came to its present state, the
decisive turning points are not, as he would have it, SlaughterHouse' and Boyd,24 but rather Hurtado' and Mapp.26 Amar
virtually disregards the eighty years of due process adjudication
separating these latter landmarks. As a result, he underestimates the
changes in circumstances that led a pragmatic judiciary to the results
he condemns. The practical consequence is that Professor Amar's
approach would permit the recurrence of the central evils the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments were designed to prevent.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 794-95.
1L at 757-61.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

1564

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

In the second place, Professor Amar, like the Warren Court
before him, is preoccupied with the Bill of Rights to the exclusion, or
at least to the neglect, of due process. Yet it is due process that most
appropriately expresses the values a free society should honor in its
criminal process. Limits on searches and interrogation, like juries and
the right to confront adverse witnesses, are only means to the larger
end of preventing punishment not authorized by judgment rendered
after a fair trial. The Bill of Rights procedures are collectively
inadequate to ensure a fair trial, and at least one of them, the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, impedes rather than
advances the pursuit of a fair inquiry into guilt or innocence.
Thus Professor Amar's approach to criminal procedure can only
end in one of two scenarios. On a robust reading of due process, his
narrow construction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is trivial,
because the Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrines he decries would
be replaced with similar rules founded on due process. On a crabbed
reading of due process, his narrow construction of the Bill of Rights
would betray both the historical purposes of those provisions and
expose contemporary citizens to police abuse and unfair trials.
The proliferation of tenuous distinctions in the case law proves
that constitutional criminal procedure desperately needs more of what
constitutional law ought to offer-general theory, neutral principles,
and a reasoned explanation of the priority of judicially-recognized
individual rights over legislatively-recognized collective goals. In my
view, Professor Amar is offering something very different.
Part I of this essay explains the importance of Amar's incorporation thesis and then suggests that his account of the Fourteenth
Amendment reveals the theoretical poverty of his program. His
interpretation of the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause is problematic
on textual and intentional grounds. Neither abolitionist constitutional
doctrine nor a fundamental rights approach to the clause justifies total
incorporation. On the politically far more plausible ground of
conventional or positivist legal theory, the long-standing judicial
refusal to invoke the boundless language of the Clause makes his
account unreasonable.
Part II turns to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. I suggest that
it was not the admitted defects of Boyd"7 and Counselman, that led
to their demise during the days of the Warren Court. Rather, it was

27. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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the advent of an effective remedy for violations of the Fourth
Amendment by state and local police that forced the destruction of
a federal model of search and seizure law, a model that had
functioned reasonably well for fifty years. The Warren Court
abandoned the assumptions supporting Boyd.29 In Terry v. Ohio,
Earl Warren himself did pretty much what Professor Amar
demands-reduce the Fourth Amendment to an inquiry into reasonableness." The Court, however, insisted on determining reasonableness on the basis of discrete, recurring categories of police
conduct, and on excluding the fruits of violations.3 '
On this score, the Court has the better of Professor Amar. The
practical weakness of damage actions as remedies for police excess
cannot be cured by any foreseeable change in the technical details of
the rules governing suits against police. Administering the last rites
to the exclusionary rule therefore would invite a return to the good
old days of midcentury. In any event, effective damage remedies,
absent the establishment of clear standards for definable categories of
police operations, might well deter legitimate police work and
encourage abuses at the same time.
As for the Fifth Amendment, Professor Amar and Ms. Lettow
deeply mistake its purpose. The privilege, unlike the common-law
rule forbidding reception of involuntary confessions, was never
understood as promoting the reliability of the trial. Reliability simply
will not justify the privilege today, and probably never could have
justified it. If we conceive of the privilege as opposing two famous
abuses-the oath ex officio and the practice of torture-we come
closer to its purpose than by looking to reliability. Professor Amar's
approach, however, concludes that neither the oath ex officio nor even
physical torture violates the Fifth Amendment privilege, so long as
the verbal admissions so extracted are not themselves admitted at the
declarant's trial.32
Would not such practices violate due process? Well, they might,
under current law-but we don't know Professor Amar's reading of

29. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not bar seizure of "mere evidence," i.e., evidence other than contraband,
fruits, and instrumentalities of crime); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,760-65 (1966)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not protect physical evidence, including
involuntary blood sample).
30. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note
15, at 801.
31. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13, 30-31.
32. Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 896-97, 926-27.
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due process. Part III concludes this essay by arguing that his
preoccupation with the Bill of Rights suggests what the experience of
the Warren and Burger Courts confirms-that in the field of criminal
procedure, we should begin our thinking with due process, rather than
with the Bill of Rights. Given a constitutional prohibition of
punishment without trial, and a constitutional requirement that trials
be fair, criminal procedure can never go too far wrong, whatever its
relation to the Bill of Rights.
I. THE INCORPORATION THESIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

A. ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure: A Thumbnail History
From the 1884 decision in Hurtado v. California3 until the last
days of the Warren Court, the central issue in constitutional criminal
procedure was the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause limited the practices of state police and state courts.
In Hurtado, the defendant sought the reversal of his murder conviction because California had instituted the prosecution by information
rather than by indictment returned by a grand jury. He claimed that
the information procedure violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 4
This claim had strong historical support. The words "due process
of law" were first used by Coke in his commentary on Magna Charta
Chapter 39, which had guaranteed that no free man would be
punished except after a judgment of peers and according to the law
of the land
In the leading antebellum due process case, Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 6 the Supreme Court
had upheld the use of a distress warrant to seize a vessel for payment
of tax liabilities because this procedure was recognized at commonlaw. Due process, the Murray'sLessee Court reasoned, meant process
accepted by the common-law. 7 The common-law, of course,
required grand jury presentment in felony cases.3" Joseph Story
thought that due process required grand jury presentment. 9 Lemuel

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

110 U.S. 516 (1884).
Id. at 520.
See id at 528-32.
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
Id. at 277.

38. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *310.
39. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 663 (1883) (John E.

Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987).
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Shaw thought the same of the law-of-the-land provision in the
Massachusetts Bill of Rights.' °
Nonetheless, eight of nine Justices rejected Hurtado's claim. To
hold that common-law procedure acquired constitutional status by
force of the Due Process Clause would "be to deny every quality of
the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or
improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians."'" Neither was due process defined by whatever procedure the
legislature provided. Due process, tracking the Magna Charta, meant
the law
of the land, but it "is not every act, legislative in form, that is
42
law.
Rather, the law of the land "refers to that law of the land in each
State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved
powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides
in the right of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at
their pleasure."'4 3 Thus was born the doctrine of fundamental
fairness, although the Court did not yet use those very words. State
legislation that conflicted with "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice" violated the law of the land and therefore due process. But
due process did not forbid procedures that were "sanctioned by age
and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice."'
Tested against these "fundamental principles," the information
Not until Moore v.
procedure accorded with due process.4'
Dempsey46 would the Court set aside a state conviction on due
process grounds.47 Not until Brown v. Mississippi48 would the Court

40. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857).
41. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
42. kd at 535.
43. Id
44. 111 at 537.
45. Id. at 538.
46. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
47. The Court did vacate a death sentence in In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890), but
not because of due process. The state had convicted Medley under a statute adopted after
the crime, one that provided for solitary confinement before execution. Id. at 164. The
Court held that punishment under the new statute violated the Ex Post Facto Laws Clause
of Article I, Section 10. Id at 173.
48. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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reverse a state conviction because of police methods. Moore involved
a mob-dominated trial; Brown involved physical torture to extract a
confession. Fundamental pretty much meant fundamental.
The Bill of Rights wasn't in the picture.49 The Hurtado Court
even reasoned that because the Fifth Amendment includes both the
Due Process Clause and the grand jury requirement, the former could
not encompass the latter.50 Time passed, however, and the Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates both the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on takings of private
property" and the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech."
When Justice Black, first in Betts v. Brady53 and then in Adamson v. California,'4 opined that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states,
he began the process that led to the present state of constitutional
procedure. His total incorporation thesis was repeatedly rejected; but
gradually the provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable in criminal
cases became "selectively incorporated" by the Fourteenth
Amendment. That story has been told often;5 what is not wellrecognized are the consequences of incorporation.
The application of the exclusionary rule to the states in 1961,56
of a right to appointed counsel in 1963,' 7 and of the privilege against
self-incrimination in 1964,58 brought federal standards of criminal
procedure into contact with the realities of prosecutions for gardenvariety state felonies. The shock was profound. While the states
struggled to accommodate the new rules, the Court-even with Earl
Warren still serving as Chief Justice-began to qualify the Bill of
Rights guarantees that had been forced on the states.

49. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (holding that due process does not
incorporate privilege against self-incrimination); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900)
(holding that Privileges-or-Immunities Clause does not include Fifth Amendment right to
grand jury presentment); Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262 (1897) (holding that
information in instant case provided adequate notice of charge).

50. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1984).
51.
52.
53.
54.

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
316 U.S. 455, 472 n.1 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).

55. See, e.g., Jerold Israel, Selective IncorporationRevisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982).
56. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. Gideon v. Wainwright, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
58. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Insinuating a spy into the intimate circle of the suspect was not
a search,5 9 while warrants to search any home in a whole neighborhood for building code violations, without any cause, let alone the
probable kind, were upheld.' Temporary detention on suspicion
and without a warrant was upheld.6 ' The Fifth Amendment
privilege was limited to testimonial evidence.62 The exclusionary
rule was not applied retroactively,' nor at the behest of anyone but
the search victim.' Justice Black himself would have exempted
electronic surveillance from the Fourth Amendment;65 he also
foreshadowed the Burger Court's line of attack on the exclusionary
rule.66
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts accelerated the process of
retrenchment, but they did not originate it. Following the Warren
Court's decision in Hoffa, the Burger Court held that any information
voluntarily disclosed to another for any purpose can be seized by the
government without implicating the Fourth Amendment. 67 Following the Warren Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker and Justice
Black's dissent in Kaufman v. United States, the Court reduced the
exclusionary rule to a shadow of its federal form.6' Following Terry
and Camara, the Court seemed to invoke Fourth Amendment
reasonableness to uphold any search the justices approved of-and
they approved of a great many.69

59. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
60. Camara v. Municipal Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967).
61. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-28 (1968).
62. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966); see supra note 29.
63. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-39 (1965).
64. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-76 (1969).
65. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 78-81 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
66. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237-242 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
67. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 35 (1976) (bank records); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979) (numbers called by telephone).
68. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception in warrant
cases); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (inevitable discovery exception); United States
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (tainted evidence admissible to impeach testimony elicited
by government on cross-examination of accused); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(state prisoners' exclusionary rule claims not cognizable on federal habeas); United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (tainted evidence admissible in civil proceedings); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (tainted evidence admissible before grand jury).
69. See Burger v. New York, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (warrantless searches of junk yards
for stolen cars reasonable); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (warrantless search
of probationer's home based on less than probable cause reasonable); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (warrantless search by school officials based on
"reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence" reasonable
(emphasis added)).
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The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied by any
performance that did not amount to a "breakdown in the adversary
process."'7 Juries of fewer than twelve7' and nonunanimous convictions72 were accepted. Miranda's predicates of custody7 and
interrogation74 were narrowly interpreted, while violations often led
to admissible evidence.'
Some of these developments, however disingenuous, reflect
sensible orderings of the competing values. Incorporation, however,
drove the Court to a method of "balancing" policy considerations
unprivileged by constitutional authority against the provisions in the
Bill of Rights. Either the Court would subvert the Bill, or the Bill
would subvert important values in the criminal process. Meanwhile,
the broader notion of due process-as forbidding punishment without
trial, and requiring that trials be fair-fell into desuetude.
Due process does not prevent police practices save those that are
"shocking to the universal sense of justice" 76-- a tough test to meet
in an era of genocidal wars and senseless criminality.77 Due process
does not require that the government disprove provocation7' or even
self-defense79 beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process does not
require the government to preserve potentially conclusive exculpatory

70. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
71. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970).
72. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion).
73. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam).
74. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding no Mirandawarnings required
when suspect is asked questions by cellmate informant); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520
(1987) (holding that confronting suspect in custody with suspect's wife and openly
recording the husband/wife conversation was not interrogation); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980) (holding that conversation purportedly between officers, but conducted in
police vehicle with arrested suspect, about risk that murder weapon would be found by
mentally-retarded youngsters attending school in neighborhood of the crime does not
constitute interrogation).
75. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (admission obtained by Miranda
violation does not taint admissions made after new warnings given); Michigan v. Tucker,

417 U.S. 433 (1974) (approving admission, of testimony by witness disclosed to police by
statement outlined in violation of Miranda);Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
(impeachment exception).
76. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (citing Kinsella v. United
States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).
77. See Donald Dripps, At the Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due
Process Test Should Replace the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. ILL.
L. REV. 261.
78. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
79. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
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evidence,80 nor, in most cases, to bear the expense of expert witnesses for the indigent." In short, incorporation stunted the development of due process, while interest-balancing undermined incorporation.
B. Amar's Version of Originalismand the Incorporation Thesis
1. Constitutional Theory: Extra-Textual Amendments and
Implied Consent
For Professor Amar, all this history holds little interest, because
in his view the Supreme Court took a fatal misstep even before
Hurtado. On his view, the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges-orImmunities Clause applies the Bill of Rights to the states; the
Slaughter-House Cases were wrongly decided. On my view, this
history shows that incorporation is an idea that badly serves criminal
procedure, so that revisiting Slaughter-House would be a most
unfortunate development. At least on the present selective-incorporation theory, states are spared the grand jury; and a strong
argument can be made to free them, at some future point, from the
privilege against self-incrimination. The prevailing selective-incorporation regime at least nominally depends on due process, and so
long as the spotlight is on due process, the relevant values in criminal
procedure have at least some hope of finally asserting themselves.
I doubt that Professor Amar would agree with this assessment of
incorporation's consequences, but at least in theory it need not
trouble him, for his argument for incorporation is based on text and
history. Incorporation is compelled by authority even if it is unwise
as policy. To skeptics who challenge the originalist premise according
text and history conclusive authority, Professor Amar, unlike most
originalists, has a coherent theoretical answer: The text and its
original purposes can be set aside at will by a majority of the nation's
voters, who are not constrained, as is the government itself by the
obstacle course process set out in the amending clause.' The failure
of the people to avail themselves of the direct-popular-amendment
80. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
81. See David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth-Seeking: A New Theory on
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 486-87

(1992).
82. See Akhil R. Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited- Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited]; Akhil
R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed ConstitutionalAmendment OutsideArticle V, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent of the Governed].
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alternative signifies a majority's implied consent to the present
Constitution, as conceived by those who made it.'
Whether extra-textual amendments be valid or not, as a
theoretical justification for originalism the Amar account is patently
unreasonable. In the first place, it mistakes the nature of political
justification; the consent of the majority is not unanimity. Even when
a majority consents to a government, that government will coerce
many who do not consent; and even among those who consent to the
government many may object to some of its policies. Think about
Germany in 1938 and again in 1946. Or think about minors and
aliens, who are bound by laws over which they exert no electoral
influence.' Majority consent is thus not a sufficient condition for
political justification; and some other account of political authority
might well dispense with majority consent as even a necessary
condition of justification. 5
83. See Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited, supra note 82, at 1073-74:
Admittedly, not even popular sovereignty can avoid all forms of entrenchment.
First, the substantive constitutional rules adopted by one generation remain the
status quo default rules governing subsequent generations unless and until
amended. However, if a subsequent, deliberate majority can in fact amend these
default rules, then their failure to do so can plausibly be seen as reflecting their
implied consent. Since by definition, some status quo default rule must always
exist, resort to some form of implied consent argument is inescapable. In
contrast, if more than a deliberate majority were required to amend the
Constitution, then the status quo would have to be justified on additional grounds
besides just the majority's implied consent. The distinctive feature of my reading
of the constitution is that it is the only reading that can rely solely on the concept
of implied consent since it ensures that a deliberate majority of the People (if
they choose to) can withhold their consent to the status quo by amendment.
(footnotes omitted).
84. Cf. DAvID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Shelby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford Press 1965):
It never was pleaded as an excuse for a rebel, that the first act he perform'd,
after he came to years of discretion, was to levy war against the sovereign of the
state; and that while he was a child he cou'd not bind himself by his own consent,
and having become a man, show'd plainly, by the first act he perform'd, that he
had no design to impose on himself any obligation To obedience.
Id. at 548.
85. Amar, in PhiladelphiaRevisited, supra note 82, at 1074 n.112, cites Rousseau for
the connection between political authority and tacit consent. But he does not mention
Hume's classic and devastating critique of social contract theories. See HuME, supra note
84, at 539-49.
It may well be that "[w]hen the Framers embraced the social contract, however, they
necessarily rejected Hume's critical views." Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and "Liberty": Their
OriginalMeaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate Over
Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 585, 590 (1994). As Amar quite rightly notes, "We
cannot say ... that the Framers' intent should govern our interpretation solely because
they intended that. We need an additional, external, argument from political philosophy
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Second, even on its own terms, the Amar account assumes that
a majority of the people know that they have the right to some extratextual amendment process. The Fourteenth Amendment may have
been an extra-textual amendment, but it is not popularly regarded as
such. In any event, the process of approving the Fourteenth
Amendment was not simultaneous nationwide popular voting.
Indeed, Professor Amar concedes that the prevailing legal view rejects
the possibility of extra-textual amendment." His account thus treats
as "consent" the failure of the people to exercise an option that has
never been successfully exercised and that most experts believe cannot
be successfully exercised.'

Finally, Amar's leap from the right to extra-textual amendment
to originalism is altogether conclusory. Supposing that consent
legitimates, and that silence gives consent, to what are the people
consenting when they stand silent? To the original meaning, after
that has been rejected by the Court? Hardly. I doubt that any citizen
of the republic, excepting Amar himself, ever has thought that the
failure to initiate a direct referendum to reaffirm original intentions
betrayed by the courts signalled rejection of the prevailing judicial
interpretation over the now-academic original understanding. The
"default rule" Amar's consent analysis really suggests is that when
to ground our circle." Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited, supra note 82, at 1072.
86. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 82, at 460-61 ("The conventional
reading" holds that Article V "enumerates the only mode(s) by which the Constitution
may be amended."); Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited, supra note 82, at 1102 ("Indeed, my
unavoidably sweeping argument here has been that legal scholars have fundamentally
misunderstood the most important features of our Constitution."). Professor Monaghan
has published a thorough critique of the extra-textual amendment thesis. See Henry P.
Monaghan, We the People[s],Original Understanding,and ConstitutionalAmendment, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 121 (1996).
87. Cf.HuME, supra note 84:
We find, that magistrates are so far from deriving their authority, and the
obligation to obedience in their subjects, from the foundation of a promise or
original contract, that they conceal, as far as possible, from their people,
especially from the vulgar, that they have their origin from thence. Were this the
sanction of government, our rulers wou'd never receive it tacitly, which is the
utmost that can be pretended; since what is given tacitly and insensibly can never
have such influence on mankind, as what is perform'd expressly and openly. A
tacit promise is, where the will is signified by other more diffuse signs than those
of speech; but a will there must certainly be in the case, and that can never
escape the person's notice, who exerted it, however silent or tacit. But were you
to ask the far greatest part of the nation, whether they had ever consented to the
authority of their rulers, or promis'd to obey them, they wou'd be inclin'd to
think very strangely of you; and wou'd certainly reply, that the affair depended
not on their consent, but that they were born to such an obedience.
Id at 547-48.
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judicial decision betrays text and history, popular acquiescence ratifies
the amendment proposed by the Court.
Now, I don't necessarily subscribe to that at all-but then I'm not
arguing to throw out 120 years of precedent. Maybe, prescription
notwithstanding, a clear showing that text and history compel
incorporation might justify overruling Slaughter-House and Dow. To
make that case, however, Amar would need a theoretical account of
precedent in constitutional cases, a theoretical account he has never
provided."8
2. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights
The incorporation debate has evoked an enormous literature.89
The recent defenders of incorporation" have linked the Privilegesor-Immunities Clause to antebellum abolitionist thought, and to
revisionist historiography that deplores reconstruction as insufficiently
radical to achieve real freedom for the former slaves.91
Professor Amar concludes that "all of the privileges and
immunities of citizens recognized in the Bill of Rights became

88. See Akhil Amar, On Lawson on Precedent,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39 (1994)
(accepting constitutional precedent as authoritative but not as absolute).
89. Prior to Amar's FourteenthAmendment article, the most prominent contributions,
in chronological order, were Charles Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV.5 (1949); William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman,
"Legislative History," and the ConstitutionalLimits on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1954); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 134-56 (1977); MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986). Dean Aynes has recently published a
fascinating history of the dispute between Fairman and Felix Frankfurter on the one hand,
and Black and Crosskey on the other. See Richard Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix
Frankfurter,and the FourteenthAmendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197 (1995).
For histories of the Fourteenth Amendment, as distinct from studies devoted to the
incorporation question, see CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT-RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, PART ONE 1207-1300 (1971); JOSEPH B.
JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); WILLIAM NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1988); Alexander Bickel, The OriginalUnderstandingandthe
SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
90. See CURTIS, supra note 89; Anar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19; Richard
L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn Bingham and the FourteenthAmendment, 103 YALE L.J.
57 (1993).
91. On the connection between the amendment and the political theory of the
Republican party, see Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of
the FourteenthAmendment, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235 (1984). For an overview on the
historiography, see the "Note on Sources" in id, at 278-79. For examples of revisionist
reconstruction histories, see, e.g., MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869 (1974);
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988).
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applicable against states by dint of the Fourteenth Amendment." 92
Some elements in the Bill of Rights are collective or states' rights, and
some of the individual guarantees may change their meaning as a
result of incorporation. For criminal procedure purposes, however,
Amar's thesis is apparently total and imperative. Whether or not the
Fifth Amendment's right to grand jury presentment or against selfincrimination, or the Sixth Amendment's vicinage requirement, or the
Seventh Amendment's civil jury requirement is a fundamental right,
each applies to the states so long as "the provision really guarantees
a privilege or immunity of individual citizens rather than a right of
states or the public at large."'93 Grand jury review would be required
in the information states; unanimous juries of twelve would be
required to convict, even in juvenile cases; and experiments with
compelled testimony would be banned.
I have argued elsewhere that the Court in criminal procedure
cases should concentrate on procedural due process, disincorporating
particular Bill of Rights provisions that do not contribute to security
from punishment without fair trial,94 and recognizing some
procedural safeguards not enumerated in the Bill of Rights when
those safeguards are essential to the fairness of the trial or the
prevention of extra-legal punishment.9" Professor Amar diagnoses
criminal procedure's condition much as I do; but his remedy is a
prescription for perpetuating the cause of the disease.
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment issue that divides us is narrow
but critical. That issue is not whether the radicals were more
enlightened than their foes. Nor is it whether the Privileges-orImmunities Clause might provide a legitimate predicate for the
incorporation of some of the Bill of Rights guarantees, or for
recognizing unenumerated rights. Nor is the issue between us
whether all of the criminal-procedure incorporation decisions should
be overruled, because security from arbitrary search and seizure, the
assistance of counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process are all
essential to procedural due process. The proposition Amar asserts,
and that I deny, is that the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause obligates
the federal courts to require the states to observe criminal procedure
92. Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1197.
93. Id.
94. See Donald Dripps, Foreword. Against Police Interrogation-andthe Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988).
95. See Donald Dripps, Beyond the Warren Courtand its Conservative Critics: Toward
a Unified Theory of ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure,23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 591, 638-39
(1990); Dripps, supra note 77.
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provisions of the Bill of Rights that do not contribute to, and may in
fact impair, the decency of police methods or the fairness of trials.
On behalf of his thesis, Professor Amar argues that some
Republicans had argued, during the struggle against slavery, that
Barron v. Baltimore96 was wrongly decided. 7 On this theory, the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" include
those in the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment made
these rights enforceable against the states. His positive argument
rests on the text of the clause" and the debates on the amendment
in Congress. 9 In his negative case, he argues that the focus of the
ratification debates on other issues,"°° and the early judicial rulings
on the incorporation issue,'"' do not fatally weaken the case for
incorporation.
What can be said against Amar's incorporation thesis? To begin
with, it suffers some serious weaknesses even internal to Amar's
consent-based constitutional theory. Regarding the text, Amar asserts
that the words of the clause are "exactly what one would expect if
incorporation were a goal of the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
It
would be equally fair to say that the text is exactly what one would
expect if protecting sexual privacy, or freedom of contract, or the
right to grow marijuana were a goal of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To say that the text is consistent with incorporation is uninteresting,
because the text is consistent with almost anything.
This poses a serious challenge to Amar's consent-based
interpretive theory, for (even assuming that a majority of the
population ratified the Fourteenth Amendment)"3 the ratifiers did
not approve the debates in Congress. It is common knowledge that
° It seems
the ratification process did not focus on incorporation.'O
96. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Barron, whose wharf lost its value when city
construction projects deposited sediment in the harbor near the wharf, sued the city for
taking his property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The unanimous Court, per Chief
Justice Marshall, held that the Bill of Rights limited only the exercise of the powers
delegated to the United States, and not the exercise of powers reserved by the states.
97. Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1198-1218.
98. L at 1218-33.
99. Id.at 1233-46.
100. Id at 1246-54.
101. Id.at 1254-60.
102. Id. at 1220 (emphasis added).
103. On the irregularity of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification process, see Bruce
Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 500-03 (1989).

104. Amar does not suggest that incorporation was affirmatively endorsed by anyone
during the ratification process; rather he draws an inference of consent from silence. See
Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1249-51. On the absence of discussion
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dubious to suppose that the ratifying polity understood the clause at
a level of particularity that specified the criminal procedure guarantees. As Amar concedes, "many informed men simply were not
Those
thinking carefully about the words of Section One at all."
who did think carefully about the words of Section One must have
realized that reasonable people could read its language in very
different ways.
The second internal problem with Amar's incorporation theory
concerns his reliance on the abolitionist opposition to Barron v.
Baltimore. Amar argues that Representative Bingham, the progenitor
of the privileges-or-immunities language, believed that prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights bound the states in theory
but not in fact. 6 The Amendment supplied the remedy, not the
rights; indeed Section One created no new rights at all.1 7
The text of the Amendment, however, does not define privileges
or immunities. The Privileges-or-Immunities Clause may be based on
the assumption that Barron was wrong, but the clause does not
declare that assumption. On Bingham's theory, the content of the
clause depends on the antebellum constitution, which the Amendment
by definition could not change. The argument for incorporation

of incorporation during the ratification process, see Fairman, supra note 89, at 81-132.
105. Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1250 (footnote omitted). I think
Amar is quite right in his response to Fairman's emphasis on ratification by states
abandoning grand jury review. Under prevailing legal opinion, the Due Process Clause
required grand jury review. What this implies is indeed that voters were thinking about
Section One at a higher level of generality than specific aspects of criminal procedure.
106. Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1233-36.
107. See Aynes, supra note 90, at 71-74. For example, in the debates on the first
version of the amendment reported out of the Joint Committee in February, 1866,
Bingham discussed Barron, but (erroneously) characterized Barron as holding that
although the Fifth Amendment applies to the states, there was no power to enforce it in
the federal government. Thus the amendment would "take from the States no rights that
belong to the States." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (Feb. 28, 1866) (statement
of Rep. Bingham). The Bill of Rights had been "in the past five years in eleven states, a
mere dead letter." Id. It was "absolutely essential to the safety of the people that it
should be enforced." Id.
Bingham reiterated these views in defending the amendment that ultimately would
become law:
Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amendment takes from
no State any right that ever pertained to it. No State ever had the right, under
the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the
laws or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic,
although many of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without
remedy.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (May 10, 1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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based on abolitionist arguments about the meaning of the antebellum
Constitution therefore contains the seeds of its own destruction.
What did (and does) the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause mean
for someone who believed (or believes) that Barron was rightly
decided? It would mean that the clause creates no new rights and
imposes no new limits on the states; it would only empower Congress
to enforce such things as the antebellum Constitution's ban on state
ex post facto laws. In other words, Bingham supposed that the Bill
applied to the states, not that the amendment changed the law to
make the Bill apply to the states. A good lawyer who rejected
Bingham's view of Barron could have read Bingham's speech and
voted for the amendment in confidence that the Privileges-orImmunities Clause could incorporate the Bill of Rights only if the
courts, for reasons independent of the Amendment, overruled
Barron."~ The focus on congressional enforcement in the debates
suggests the absence of any expectation that such a change would
come over the courts.
On Bingham's theory, the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses would not be redundant with the Privileges-or-Immunities
Clause. 9 If the courts overruled Barron then indeed the Due
Process Clause would be redundant, but that event was contingent in
1866 and in fact never occurred. The Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses conferred new powers on both courts and Congress.
Even if Barron remained the law, these clauses, coupled with Section
Five, gave Congress power to adopt the Civil Rights Act. Due
process was too important to trust to luck; but the rest of the Bill
could be applied by the courts to the states only if the courts decided
that Barron had been wrongly decided in 1833.
Thus the incorporation theory predicated on the abolitionist
argument that slavery violated the antebellum Constitution falls short
of its goal because the abolitionist argument was erroneous and could

108. This point was noted by incorporation proponent Alfred Avins. See Alfred Avins,
Incorporationof the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-FairmanDebatesRevisited, 6 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 1, 14-15 (1968).
109. Professor Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 19, at 1224-25, suggests that

the Due Process Clause was not redundant with the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause
because the former protects "persons," including aliens, rather than "citizens." This
argument, however, creates a textual embarrassment for his incorporation theory, because
the Bill of Rights provisions refer to persons, rather than to citizens. Why would the

framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, supposedly venerators of the Bill, not apply to
aliens what the Bill applied to "persons"--namely, the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
self-incrimination privilege?
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not be made retroactively accurate. The amendment might have
adopted abolitionist theory for the future; it could have done with the
other clauses in the Bill what it did with the Due Process Clause. But
it did not, leaving the courts free to adhere to Barron and thus to
deny that the privileges or immunities of United States citizens
include freedom from state interference with rights protected by the
Bill against the federal government.
No one in Congress expected the courts to play the primary role
in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that the House
rejected a prior version framed as a pure grant of legislative
power,"0 and that the version finally adopted is facially self-executing. But unlike due process and equal protection, on Bingham's
declaratory theory, the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause derives its
meaning from the antebellum Constitution. Should the courts change
their position and agree with Bingham that Barronhad been wrongly
decided, the courts could indeed act on the Privileges-or-Immunities
Clause. But if they made that change, they could act directly against
the states on the basis of the first eight amendments."'
In fact, a unanimous Supreme Court in Twitchell v. Commonwealth"' reaffirmed Barron as soon as the ink was dry on the
Fourteenth Amendment. Twitchell was tried for murder after the
Amendment came into effect." After his conviction, he sought a
writ of error from the Supreme Court on the ground that his indictment, by not specifying the method of causing the victim's death,
violated his Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the charge
against him. The Supreme Court, after oral argument but apparently
without briefing, dismissed the petition for the writ of error. In a
terse opinion, the Court quoted extensively from Barronv. Baltimore
to support the proposition that the Sixth Amendment did not apply
to the states." 4

110. See, eg., NELSON, supra note 89, at 50-57.
111. In debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, Charles Sumner defended the theory
that the antebellum Constitution applied the Bill of Rights to the states. His speech sheds
some light on a question that Bingham did not address-the role of the courts. Sumner,
consistent with the theory that the Bill of Rights always had applied to the states but that
Congress had been delegated no enforcement power, asserted that the courts could
abandon Barron and enforce the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause against the states.

See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1479-83 (1864) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
112. 74 U.S. 321 (1869).
113. The indictment was filed in December, 1868. See id&at 322. The amendment was
declared effective by Congress and by the Secretary of State in the previous July. See 3
RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 679 (1986).
114. See Twitchell, 74 U.S. at 325-26.
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Now maybe all that was going on in Twitchell was gross
negligence by defense counsel, who failed to rely specifically on the
Fourteenth Amendment. Still, Twitchell was a capital case, heard but
six days prior to the day fixed for execution. Suppose, as the modern
incorporationists hold, that among Republicans generally the
antebellum Constitution was thought to extend the Bill of Rights to
the states and that the Fourteenth Amendment was only declaratory
of Barron's error. Would a unanimous Court then rely on Barron at
all, let alone to execute a man whose lawyer failed to plead the right
amendment? Would the Court do that without at least bringing the
case up for full briefing and argument? This seems most unlikely,
especially given that the Twitchell Court included Justice Swayne and
Justice Field, both of whom would later dissent in Slaughter-House.
Amar explains Twitchell as judicial incompetence, pure and
simple. Because Twitchell did invoke the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment on its face applies
due process to the states, he concludes that the Court's resolution of
the case5 shows only that the justices didn't know what they were
doing."
On its face that is not a very convincing account. We should not
presume incompetence from all nine justices, plus defense counsel,
without exhausting other possible explanations. In fact, there is
another explanation, not just plausible but quite convincing.
Twitchell's due process argument was derivative of his Sixth
Amendment notice and Fifth Amendment presentment arguments.
There are no briefs for the case in the Supreme Court archives,
probably because the issue was whether to stay the imminent
execution by bringing the case to the Court for full review on a writ
of error. There was no time for preparing papers. We have only the
oral argument as represented in the official report. According to that
report, Twitchell's lawyer invoked due process only by claiming that
the failure of Sixth Amendment notice made the conviction unconstitutional." 6 The Sixth Amendment made the conviction a

115. Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1255.
116. See Twitchell, 74 U.S. at 323-24:
Mr. Hubbel4 in support of the motion, contended, that the act of the
Pennsylvania Assembly was repugnant to the 5th and 6th Amendments of the
Constitution-to the last especially-that under these the prisoner had a right to
be informed, before the trial, by the indictment, and so of record, that the
murder was alleged to have been brought about by some particular instrument
... to be informed, in other words, of the specific nature of the accusation, so as

that he might be enabled to prepare for a defence; whereas, here the indictment
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nullity, so the death warrant was not authorized by a valid judgment
and violated due process. f, however, the Sixth Amendment claim
failed, the due process claim would also fail.
The Court, then, did not need to discuss Twitchell's due process
claim. This was not, as Amar would have it, because the Justices
didn't know that the Fourteenth Amendment contained a Due
Process Clause, but because disposition of the Sixth Amendment
claim defeated the due process theory. Twitchell was in fact indicted
by grand jury and tried by a petit jury, so that a free-standing due
process claim would have been weak under the law as it stood before
Hurtado."7 According to the report of the argument and to the
Court's opinion, Twitchell's counsel clearly emphasized the Sixth
The Justices actually heard the argument, an
Amendment."'
argument unavailable to us. We should assume that they decided the
question they thought had been presented.
In short, Twitchell proves that, at least with respect to the Sixth
Amendment criminal procedure guarantees, a unanimous Supreme
Court thought Barron was good law immediately after the adoption
,of the Fourteenth Amendment. Contra Amar, the Court cannot be
written off as ignorant of the Amendment's text, because Amar is
wrong when he asserts that Twitchell raised a due process claim that

stated but the general nature of the accusation, namely, that the prisoner had
murdered Mrs. Hill; that the provisions of the Pennsylvania statute had been
copied from a late British statute, and had departed from the principles of the
common law-principles not more considerate and humane than just;-which,
nevertheless, under the Constitution of the United States, remained, and
remaining, were secured to all men; that the court below erred in not deciding
in accordance with the view here presented, and that the warrant of the
Governor for the execution was, therefore, not a "due process" of law.
When Twitchell's lawyer invoked "the 5th and 6th Amendments" he claimed that the
Pennsylvania practice violated the Fifth Amendment grand jury presentment requirement
because the Commonwealth's practice departed from the common-law practice. He also
claimed that, independent of the Fifth Amendment right to grand jury presentment, the
failure to allege the manner of causing death failed to give notice of the charge as required
by the Sixth Amendment. The only invocation of due process comes against the death
warrant, not against the pleadings or the trial.
117. Twitchell's lawyer did indeed raise the argument that the failure to allege the
manner of the killing departed from common-law practice in a way inconsistent with the
grand jury presentment requirement of the Fifth Amendment. But unless there was a
substantial failure to supply notice of the charge, such as would make out a Sixth
Amendment violation, the presentment argument is simply an effort to slip through a legal
loophole. That is probably why Twitchell's lawyer raised the presentment claim, but relied
primarily on the Sixth Amendment notice claim.
118. See Twitchell, 74 U.S. at 323, 325.
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was independent of his Sixth Amendment notice claim or his Fifth
Amendment presentment claim.
Even if Twitchell had relied exclusively on the Fifth Amendment,
the case would still furnish weighty evidence against Amar's
declaratory theory. TWitchell's lawyer, whether by negligence or
design, made precisely the argument that Bingham would have
made-that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply directly to
Pennsylvania, just as they always had, Barron notwithstanding. On
Bingham's view, Twitchell's lawyer could pick and choose among the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clauses, for the Fifth Amendment clause applied to the states. A
unanimous Court declined to depart from Barron,meaning that after
the Fourteenth Amendment, just as before, the Bill of Rights didn't
apply to the states. Given Twitchell, Slaughter-House is consistent
with the declaratory theory; all the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause
did was grant congressional enforcement power for preexisting federal
rights against state governments.
Amar also relies on Senator Howard's sponsoring speech as
evidence for the incorporation thesis." 9 Howard did not expressly
rely on Bingham's erroneous assumption about prior law. Rather, he
treated the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause as a new grant of federal
power, to both courts and legislators, to enforce fundamental rights
against the states. These, he asserted, included, but were not limited
to, "the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight
amendments.""
Unquestionably, Howard's speech endorses the
modem incorporation theory.
Howard's speech, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with my
claim that the courts need not enforce the grand jury requirement and
the self-incrimination privilege against the states. Howard, citing
Corfield v. Coryell,"2' described the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause
as protecting fundamental rights. These fundamental rights "are not
and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise
nature."'" When Howard illustrated the Bill of Rights, he ticked
off the First Amendment's speech, press, and petition clauses, the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, the Third
Amendment's ban on quartering soldiers, the Fourth Amendment

119. See Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1236-38. For the speech, see

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
121. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
122. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
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(including a warrant requirement!), and the Sixth Amendment's
vicinage requirement. Howard, however, left out the religion clauses,
grand jury presentment, the privilege against self-incrimination,
confrontation, compulsory process, counsel, and civil jury trial.
Admittedly, Howard's list purports to illustrate, not exhaust, the
"personal rights" in the Bill. He did not, however, advert specifically
to self-incrimination or to grand juries; and he thought of privilegesor-immunities generally as fundamental rights which could not be
precisely defined. A ratifier could not have consented to the grand
jury and self-incrimination provisions simply by reading the text of the
amendment, nor even by reading a copy of Howard's speech, but-only
by cross-referencing Howard's speech with the Fifth Amendment.
If Amar insists that Howard's speech was consented to by the
ratifiers, he himself has a serious problem with the particularity with
which Howard expressed himself. Howard described the Fourth
Amendment rights incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment as
"the right to be exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
from any search or seizure except by virtue of a warrant issued upon
a formal oath or affidavit[.]"'" If Amar accepts Howard's representations at the level of particularity required by total incorporation, he
is stuck with the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement he so
vigorously criticizes.
I don't believe that Amar has that problem, because on his
consent theory it seems highly probable that the ratifiers understood
the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause at a much higher level of
generality than Howard described. Any ratifier who did parse the
congressional debates would have realized that Congress paid more
attention to Section Three's disqualification provisions than to Section
One, and that such attention as was given left serious doubts about
the meaning of Section One. Bingham described it as a delegation of
legislative power to enforce the antebellum Constitution. Howard
described it as protecting fundamental rights and those in the Bill; and
as both a delegation of enforcement power and as self-executing.
Stevens apparently agreed with Bingham's declaratory view, and saw
the amendment as a grant of power to Congress to force racial
equality upon the states. 4 Other speakers characterized Section

123. Id.
124. The provisions in Section One
are all asserted, in some form or other, in our DECLARATION or organic law.
But the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on
the States. The amendment supplied that defect, and allows Congress to correct
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One as both securing the constitutionality of the civil rights and of
insulating the protections of the act against repeal except by
constitutional amendment."z
Amar does not deal with an item in the debates that, given the
spaciousness of the privileges-or-immunities language, supports an
agnostic view of the clause's meaning as strongly as Howard's
supports incorporation. At the close of debate in the Senate, Reverdy
Johnson, a Democrat but an able lawyer,12 expressed approval of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, but thought it "quite
objectionable to provide that 'no State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States,' simply because I do not understand what will be the
effect of that."' ' Johnson had served on the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction; Bingham, Stevens and Howard had all expressed
themselves; and Johnson still didn't know what he was voting on. The
rest of the country could hardly have been better informed.
The substitution of the information procedure for indictment by
grand jury in the immediate aftermath of the amendment's adoption
suggests that contemporary legislators and judges did not understand
Section One as requiring total incorporation. A good lawyer in 1866
would have read the Due Process Clause as requiring grand jury
presentment.'2 Several states, however, ratified the Amendment
near the time they abandoned grand jury review."2 9 In the one preSlaughter-House decision on this question, the Supreme Court of

the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one
man shall operate equally upon all.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
125. See id. at 2462 (statement of Rep. Garfield); id. at 2498 (May 9, 1866) (statement
of Rep. Broomall); id.at 2511 (statement of Rep. Eliot); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONsTrruTnON IN THE SUPREME COURT 347 (1985) ("Speaker after speaker proclaimed

that it was this statute for which the fourteenth amendment would provide an unassailable
constitutional base."); NELSON, supra note 89, at 115 ("At the very least, section one was
understood to remove all doubts about the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
and thus to give Congress legislative power in reference to basic rights of contract,
property, and personal security.").
126. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 89, at 45.
127. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041(1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
128. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
129. See Fairman, supra note 89, at 81-135; id. at 101 (Kansas abandoned grand jury
presentment in 1868); iUL at 110 (Wisconsin abandoned grand jury presentment in 1870);
id. at 115-16 (Michigan abandoned grand jury presentment in 1859).
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Wisconsin unanimously rejected the claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires states to proceed by indictment. 30
When the issue reached the Supreme Court in the Hurtado case,
eight Justices rejected the claim despite its historical support. Nor
was the result in Hurtadoforeclosed by the Slaughter-House decision,
for Hurtado invoked the Due Process Clause rather than the
Privileges-or-Immunities Clause.
The grand jury decisions reflect the conclusion that Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment speaks at a higher level of generality
Even if a good
than particular modes of criminal procedure.'
lawyer in 1866 could not have voted to ratify the Amendment without
understanding that due process requires grand juries, the courts did
not insist that the precise procedures required by due process in 1866
would be the precise procedures due process required forever. To
argue that the ratiflers unwittingly imposed the grand jury on
themselves because they adopted a constitutional amendment
containing a code word for grand juries is to say that the people
consented to a pig in a poke.
In criminal prosecutions under the Civil Rights Act, the lower
These
federal courts divided over the incorporation question."
prosecutions were pursuant to congressional enactment, in the
formerly rebellious states. That incorporation should be debatable

130. Rowans v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 148-50 (1872). The conviction was reversed,
however, because the jurors were allowed to go home for the nights during the trial.
131. See Patricia Allen Lucie, White Rights as a Model for Black: Or-Who's Afraid
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause?, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 859, 869 (1987) (congressional debates on Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments endorse the Bill of Rights "as
a corollary of freedom" but do not suggest "concern with the details of the Bill of
Rights"); id. at 871 ("I am content to let Charles Fairman's argument stand-that the
debates both in Congress and in the ratifying conventions disclose no intention or
awareness that the privileges or immunities clause would revolutionize state practices to
harmonize them with specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.").
132. Compare United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.C. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282)
with United States v. Crosby, 25 Fed. Cas. 701 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (No. 14,893). In Hall,
the court not only held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights,
but that the Equal Protection Clause required the states to restrain private individuals
from interfering with the exercise of privileges or immunities. "And as it would be
unseemly for congress to interfere directly with state enactments, and as it cannot compel
the activity of state officials, the only appropriate legislation it can make is that which will
operate directly on offenders and offenses, and protect the rights which the amendment
secures." Hall,26 F. Cas. at 81.
In Crosby, the court dismissed a count of an indictment under the Civil Rights Act
for violating the victim's Fourth Amendment rights. See 25 F. Cas. at 704 ("The article
in the Constitution of the United States, to enforce which this count is supposed to be
drawn, has long been decided to be a mere restriction upon the United States itself.").
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even in this context suggests that incorporation is not mandated by
the original understanding.
Internally, then, Amar's argument depends on the ratifiers
sharing the understanding of Bingham or Howard. If they accepted
Bingham's views, they assumed the risk that the judges would not
overrule Barron. If they relied on Howard, they consented to grand
juries and the self-incrimination privilege only if they extended his
understanding to the detailed level of the criminal procedure
guarantees in the Bill, most of which were never mentioned even by
Howard. Given the vagueness of the clause's language, the focus of
the ratification process on other matters, and the Supreme Court's
unanimous rejection of the contrarian argument for overruling
Barron, this is pulling a large rabbit out of a small hat.
From a theoretical premise external to Amar's, one consonant
with actual political practice, his thesis becomes indefensible. From
a positivist or conventionalist standpoint, legal validity depends on
consistency with conventionally recognized exclusionary reasons or
authoritative considerations. 3 The justification for constraints of
133. The classic conventionalist account is H.L.A. Hart's version of legal positivism.
According to Hart, a legal system is a union of primary rules directed at individuals
generally, and secondary rules addressed to officials to take appropriate action in response
to failures to observe the primary rules. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96
(1961). A legal system must include a master rule, however complex, that determines the
validity of other legal rules; this rule of recognition itself rests only on sustained, politically
effective acceptance. See id. at 113 ("[R]ules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal
validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common
public standards of official behaviour by its officials.").
Hart's model has been attacked on many fronts, some important but none fatal. For
some of the more important objections, see DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF
LAW 54-60 (1984) (arguing that many nonlegal institutions combine primary and secondary
rules; law must be distinguished from them either by social function or by moral value);
NEIL MAcCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 108-11 (1981) (stating that Hart's theory of secondary
rules presupposes rule of recognition, while rule of recognition presupposes secondary
rules); PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 30-31 (1984) (finding that Hart's model is
inconsistent because its "descriptions of a society's rules of obligation on the one hand and
of the official acceptance of legal rules on the other differ markedly").
The most prominent objection to Hart's model comes from Ronald Dworkin, who
argues that judges neither should nor do analyze legal problems in two stages, the first
totally controlled by authority and the second, when authority leaves discretion, wholly
uncontrolled by authority. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 114-50 (1986) (Ch.
Four). Whatever the merits of Dworkin's objection as a theoretical matter, I think that
in American practice, especially constitutional practice, the rule of recognition incorporates
the moral elements of legal reasoning that Dworkin emphasizes. As Hart puts it, in his
posthumous reply to Dworkin, "[d]escription may still be description, even when what is
described is an evaluation." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 244 (2d ed. 1994); cf
David Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415, 424 (1977)
(reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)); Philip Soper, Legal
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any sort is simple: Constraints on decision promote justice indirectly." The case for conventionally recognized constraints over
unconventional constraints is equally easy: constraints that can be
reinvented at will fail to constrain, and so the object of justice will less
likely be achieved.
Even in an odious regime with many unjust laws, we would still
object to judges disregarding conventional constraints on their
authority absent very strong countervailing obligations. We would,
for instance, properly criticize a Nazi judge who applied the wrong
statute of limitations to a tort claim by one "Aryan" against another,
even though Jews could not sue "Aryans" at all.
But of course the case for conventionalism is stronger, when, as
in the United States, the contribution of conventional authorities is
not exhausted by their formal character. If you agree that the
conventional practice of American constitutionalism promotes justice
either (or more likely both) because of the need for formal constraints
on official power or because the specific conventions that have taken
root in America promote the sort of liberal democracy that seems to
be the best form of government yet devised, then you have reason
enough to say that conventional validity deserves normative respect.
The Justices themselves are in no position to question this account,
for their practical power depends upon its acceptance by the country.'35

Theory and the Obligationof the Judge: The HartiDworkinDispute,75 MICH. L. REV. 473
(1977)-- 134. As Larry Alexander puts it:
For example, no one may believe that the Constitution is an ideal set of
authoritative rules in terms of his or her own political/moral principles. But
everyone may believe that the Constitution is, in terms of those same principles,
the best set of authoritative rules that it is possible to get everyone, or enough
others, to accept as authoritative. Thus, in the real, imperfect world, the
Constitution may be ideal.
Larry Alexander, The Constitutionas Law, in 6 CONSTIT. COMMENTARY 103, 109 (1989).
135. This is why, for instance, Gary Lawson's argument against constitutional precedent
is unpersuasive. See Gary Lawson, The ConstitutionalCase Against Precedent,17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 23 (1994). If the Justices themselves owe no fidelity to decisions of the
Supreme Court, why should anyone accept a Supreme Court decision with which he or she
disagrees as a matter of unconstrained moral reasoning? Judge Bork had it exactly right
in 1971: The idea of constitutional adjudication cut loose from text and history, predicated
on unconstrained moral arguments, invites the losing party to appeal to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff-"a body with rather better means for implementing its decisions." Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971).
Bork, of course, has the same problem: why, on his rigid interpretivist account, shouldn't
those who disagree with the framers direct their appeals to the Joint Chiefs?
But on a conventional account the connection between obligation and adjudication
is secured. All recognize that the existing rule of recognition varies from each individual's
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Convention clearly privileges text and history as considerations
in constitutional decisionmaking, but it is equally clear that text and
history are not the only permissible considerations. Precedent,
prudence, representation reinforcement, and unconstrained ideas of
good policy all have played their role in American constitutional
practice. From a conventional point of view, the case against total
incorporation under the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause emphasizes
the scope of judicial power privileges-or-immunities litigation would
confer; the unbroken line of precedent nullifying the clause on
precisely this ground; and the apprehension that at least some of the
Bill of Rights criminal procedure provisions are perverse
anachronisms.
The language of the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause is so vague
that it confers enormous discretion on the courts. Justice Miller wrote
Slaughter-Housewith this concern in mind. Miller feared a "perpetual
censorship ' '136 of state legislation if the Court embraced a broad
interpretation of the clause. Lochner was the logical legacy of Field's
dissent, and the realization of Miller's fear. John Hart Ely,137 Philip
'
Kurland,13
Herbert Wechsler, 39
Robert Bork, 40 David

vision of ideal justice. All recognize that the existing rule of recognition is bbtter than
what would likely replace it. All who invoke its protection are bound by logical
consistency to support it. And, while some private citizens might conceivably maintain a
consistently agnostic attitude toward political authority, or distinguish a commitment to
some of the system's rules but not to others, officials generally and justices in particular
stand in neither posture. The justices claim obedience to the law qua law. See Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1957).
136. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).
137. See ELY, supra note 12, at 30 (stating that the clause is "a delegation to future
constitutional decision-makers to protect rights that are not listed either in the Fourteenth
Amendment or elsewhere in the document").
138. Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round
at Last"?, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE 26, 27 (Jules B. Gerard ed., 1973) ("With legislative history as a guide,
the privileges or immunities clause took the form of a blank check.").
139. Herbert Wechsler, EqualProtectionIs a Double-EdgedSword, in ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

39, 40

(Jules B. Gerard ed., 1973).
140. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTNG OF AMERICA 37 (1990) ("Though some have

complained bitterly about this, Miller was following a sound judicial instinct: to reject a
construction of the new amendment that would leave the Court at large in the field of
public policy without any guidelines other than the views of its members.").
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Currie, 4 ' and Richard Posner 42 have all concluded that the clause
is practically boundless.
Amar admits this is a concern. He suggests that the clause might
function as an equality provision with respect to statutory and
common-law rights,'4 and that the breadth of the textual language
gives judges special reasons for caution. Yet he elsewhere admits that
privileges or immunities include the private-law rights protected by
the 1866 Civil Rights Act,'" and the habeas corpus clause,145 as
well as the Bill of Rights. Any provision broad enough to include the
right to transfer real estate, the right to own a firearm, and the right
to have a contract action heard by a jury is as suspiciously broad as
Slaughter-House is suspiciously narrow. If Justice Miller struggled
mightily to find some right that the clause includes, Amar would have
to struggle mightily to find some right that the clause excludes.
The search for a limiting interpretation drove the SlaughterHouse majority to nullify the clause. This might be justifiable; given
a boundless grant of federal power to supervise state legislation, it
might be best to leave the exercise of that power to an accountable
Congress. The assumption by those involved in adopting the
amendment that Congress would have primary enforcement responsibility for the clause supports this result, even on purely intentionalist
grounds.
If however, the judicial nullification of the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause is rejected, incorporation does not necessarily follow.
Privileges-or-immunities might refer to those rights that citizens of
one state might claim in another under Article NV's Privileges-andImmunities Clause. In the antebellum case of Corfield v. Coryell,'46
Justice Washington declared that the Article IV clause permitted
some discrimination in favor of local citizens, but riot with respect to
"fundamental" rights. Thus the Fourteenth Amendment's Privilegesor-Immunities Clause might mean either that states must respect
fundamental rights, or that states could not discriminate invidiously
in the availability of those privileges or immunities state law extended

141. CURRIE, supra note 125, at 347. As Professor Currie puts it, the clause offers "the
judicial holy grail ... that lets us strike down any law we do not like." ld. (footnote
omitted).
142. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 246 (1995) (citing CURRIE, supra note

125, at 344-51).
143. Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1231.
144. Id at 1230.
145. Id. at 1228.
146. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
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to white males. The convergence of these interpretations with the
provisions of the 1866 Civil Rights Act reinforces their plausibility.
Amar's thesis differs slightly but significantly from these
alternatives. In the 1860s and even today, either the fundamental
rights approach or the equality approach would require most states to
respect most of the personal liberties mentioned in the Bill of Rights.
Under a fundamental rights approach, such items as freedom of
speech and conscience, and security from arbitrary search and
detention, qualify as privileges or immunities. Under an equality
approach, state constitutions typically contain bills of rights highly
similar to the Federal Constitution's. 47
At first blush the difference in theories may be slight, but it can
have a great deal of significance. Under either the fundamental rights
or the equality approach, states might depart from the federal Bill of
Rights so long as they denied rights that were not fundamental on a
nondiscriminatory basis. If a state abolished grand jury presentment
in criminal cases for both white and black defendants, the state's
practice offends Amar's interpretation, but not the fundamental rights
or the equality interpretation.
Thus it is certainly possible, even if it is not desirable, to
recognize a wider role for the clause than the Slaughter-House case
recognized. In conventional terms, however, there is the further
problem of Slaughter-Houseitself and all the precedents reinforcing
it. The Privileges-or-Immunities Clause, says that rigid intepretivist
Robert Bork, is a "cadaver."' Even if Slaughter-House was wrong,
prescription can convert an erroneous decision into a precedent
worthy of content-independent respect.
Now Amar might reply that substantive due process is just
privileges-or-immunities litigation in drag. Under the rubric of
substantive due process, incorporation has become the conventionally
recognized norm. Civil jury trial and grand juries are, arguably, the
outlying cases that demand special justification. This is a plausible
argument, but ultimately not persuasive.
First, the argument overstates the scope of incorporation actually
recognized in the cases. In state cases criminal juries need not be
composed of twelve persons nor be unanimous, and they are not
required at all in the substantial percentage of criminal cases heard in
the juvenile courts. The Fourth Amendment, Confrontation Clause,
147. See NELSON, supra note 89, at 116-19; John Harrison, Reconstructingthe Privileges
or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1465 (1992).
148. BORK, supra note 140, at 180.
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and Compulsory Process Clause cases all reach results that could just
as easily be reached purely on due process grounds-searches must be
"reasonable" and the rules of evidence must not undermine the
reliability of the trial. The grand jury and civil jury requirements are
affirmatively not incorporated. So it would not be fair to characterize
the current corpus of precedent as implicitly requiring incorporation.
Second, if substantive due process is legitimate because the
Slaughter-House case erroneously rejected the fundamental-rights
interpretation of the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause, total incorporation doesn't follow because the fundamental-rights approach
doesn't require total incorporation. Special justification for refusing
to incorporate the grand jury requirement or the self-incrimination
clause is easy enough to establish.'49 In the grand jury context, in

fact, that justification is so easy to establish that the Court has refused
to incorporate the grand jury requirement despite clear evidence that
"due process"-let alone privileges-or-immunities-was understood to
require grand juries in 1866.
From a conventional point of view, Justice Reed's reply to
Justice Black in Adamson v. Californiais as cogent today as it was in
1947:
After declaring that state and national citizenship
coexist in the same person, the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids a state from abridging the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States. As a matter of words, this
leaves a state free to abridge, within the limits of the due
process clause, the privileges and immunities flowing from
state citizenship. This reading of the Federal Constitution
has heretofore found favor with the majority of this Court as
a natural and logical interpretation. It accords with the
constitutional doctrine of federalism by leaving to the states
the responsibility of dealing with the privileges and immunities of their citizens except those inherent in national
It is the construction placed upon the
citizenship.
amendment by justices whose own experience had given
them contemporaneous knowledge of the purposes that led
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
construction has become embedded in our federal system as

149. See, ag., David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination?,33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063 (1986); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries
Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995).
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a functioning element in _reserving the balance between
national and state power.'
Even considering text and history in isolation, the Privileges-orImmunities Clause cannot justify incorporating the Bill's criminal
procedure provisions. On the theoretically far more plausible premise
of legal conventionalism, the incorporation thesis is simply unreasonable. In predicating constitutional criminal procedure on
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, Amar crafts a constitutional
design that is at once illegitimate, and, as the experience of the
Warren Court suggests, unwise.
II. THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS

Amar's commitment to incorporation plays itself out in his
treatments of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. That commitment
leads him to characterize the Supreme Court's search-and-seizure
jurisprudence as ahistorical and incoherent, when in fact the cases can
only be understood by recognizing the difference incorporation made.
Amar characterizes the federal model of search-and-seizure law, based
on the exclusionary rule, the warrant requirement, and probable
cause, as "Lochner's legacy.' 5' But the Justices crafted the federal
150. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1947) (citations omitted).
151. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 785-91. Amar then drops a
footnote to Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987), but all that
Amar borrows from Sunstein is alliteration. On Sunstein's view, the decline of Lochner
expresses skepticism about the inevitability and/or the desirability of defining the
constitutional status quo ante according to common law rules. On Amar's view, the
appropriate baseline for Fourth Amendment analysis is the common law of torts. See
Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 801-04 (discussing "Common-Sense (Tort)
Reasonableness" as test of Fourth Amendment rights); id at 813 ("Strict entity liability in
the twentieth century makes perfect sense as the substitute for-indeed, the exact
equivalent of-strict officer liability in the eighteenth century."). Professor Sunstein is
quite careful to say that aspects of Lochner's concern for common law baselines are
possibly wise and certainly too deeply embedded in our legal system to extirpate. See
Sunstein, supra, at 915-17. But it is odd of Amar, who places such a premium on
founding-era common law practice, to invoke the Sunstein lecture.
Amar continues:
Boyd and its immediate progeny involved corporate and regulatory offenses,
rather than violent crime. These cases took root in a judicial era that we now
know by the name Lochner, and the spirit inspiring Boyd and its progeny was
indeed akin to Lochner's spirit: a person has a right to his property, and it is
unreasonable to use his property against him in a criminal proceeding.
Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 788 (citation omitted). Arguably Amar
means that only the early exclusionary rule cases dovetail with Lochner, but in fact the
early exclusionary rule cases-Weeks, Silverthorne, and Agnello-all recognized a warrant
requirement. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) ("While the question
has never been directly decided by this court, it has always been assumed that one's house
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model on the explicit assumption that it would not apply to the states
(as substantive due process clearly did, e.g., Lochner). And the
federal model collapsed not because the Justices at last realized its
inherent defects, but because Mapp v. Ohio"2 brought the model
into contact with the wide variety of searches and seizures practiced
by state government.
This failure to place adequate emphasis on federalism in Amar's
historical account in turn infects his positive Fourth Amendment
program. Mapp was a shock because, absent the exclusionary rule,
constitutional limits on search and seizure had become impotent. If
legislatures faced incentives to provide meaningful tort remedies,
Mapp would have been neither necessary nor revolutionary.
Professor Amar admits that his whole program stands or falls
together,53 so that absent the effective tort remedies he envisions,
his approach should be rejected.
As for the Fifth Amendment, the incorporation assumption
implies that there must be some rationale for the privilege against
self-incrimination. Amar and Lettow rightly reject most of the pious
apologies that are typically offered on behalf of the privilege," 4 but
then propose that the privilege is justified because it prevents the
This
introduction of unreliable evidence against the accused.'
proposition is dubious standing alone, but the authors gloss it with the
yet more doubtful corollary that physical fruits of compelled

cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful
arrest therein.") (citing Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne,and Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921)); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390 (1920) (holding
search illegal because made "without a shadow of authority"); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 390-91 (1914) (rejecting the use of evidence seized from defendant's house with
no arrest or search warrant). As Amar recognizes, the probable cause standard is the
"yoked mate" of the warrant requirement. Amar, FourthAmendment, supra note 15, at
782.
Thus, the cases establishing the federal model all recognize the warrant and probable
cause requirements. They cannot fairly be equated with Lochner, for they did not apply
to the states. In any event, the federal model was not exclusively concerned with business
crimes. In Weeks the seized papers related to illegal gambling; in Agnello the suppressed
evidence was cocaine.
152. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
153. Amar, FourthAmendment, supra note 15, at 759 (defending "package... taken
as a whole"); id at 761 n.5 ("I emphasize that my package of criticisms and alternatives
is offered as a whole.").
154. Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 889-95. I quite agree with
Amar's objections to the usual justifications for the privilege. See Dripps, supra note 94,
at 711-18.
155. Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 900-01.
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testimony should be admissible because they are more reliable than
testimony. 6
Reason leads Amar and Lettow to the brink of a heresy against
constitutional faith-that the Constitution might include a thoroughgoing mistake that cannot be saved even by the cleverest
interpretation. But they will not take the final plunge, and offer
instead an interpretation of the privilege so narrow that it would undo
most of the good the privilege does, without much mitigating its ill
effects on the search for truth.
Those not committed to the incorporation theory can bring
themselves to a more sensible conclusion. The privilege is a mistake
and should be repealed. Until repeal, the privilege plainly limits the
federal government, and as against that sovereign should be read at
least broadly enough to prevent the historic abuses that inspired it.
But the privilege is not binding on the states by anything more
substantial than the ipse dixit of Malloy v. Hogan. 7 One important
advantage of Slaughter-House and Hurtado lies in their ability to
permit the states to compel self-incrimination through lawful process.
Amar's thought thus tracks the experience of the Warren Court
in an interesting way. Insisting on incorporation, he underestimates
how eighty years of nonincorporation influenced criminal procedure
doctrine. He then concludes that the Bill of Rights imposes only
modest restraints on government, whether state or federal. Attention
is deflected from due process, at the very time that narrow
interpretations of the Bill of Rights leave the Due Process Clause with
much important work to do. In taking the incorporation approach to
constitutional criminal procedure, Professor Amar travels down an old
road, in the wrong direction.
A. The Fourth Amendment
1. The Rise and Fall of the Federal Model of the Fourth
Amendment
One consequence of Amar's devotion to incorporation is that he
gives too little weight to the relation between the state and federal
cases that came to the Supreme Court during the period separating
Boyd and Mapp. As a result, his understanding of what the Court has
done in the Fourth Amendment cases is ironically ahistorical.

156. It at 911-19.
157. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

1996]

A CRITIQUE OFAKHIL AMAR

1595

Whether or not the incorporation thesis is correct on the merits,
Amar's commitment to incorporation leads to misunderstanding the
case law.
To read Amar, you would think that in the late 1960s and early
1970s the gross error of Boyd v. United States finally collapsed of its
own weight. Then, at last, the exclusionary rule and the warrant and
probable cause requirements began to be seen for what they
58
are-pure inventions by thoughtless, Lochner-era Justices.
Stripped of its Fifth Amendment pretensions, the exclusionary rule
was exposed as an irrational and illegitimate remedy; the "warrant
requirement" sank into a quicksand of exceptions; and probable cause
gave way to a balancing test that looked to reasonableness.
All these things happened, but they did not happen because the
old model of the Fourth Amendment was finally recognized as a
fraud. Rather, the warrant/probable cause/exclusionary rule model
was born because the birth of modem police forces coincided with the
decline of tort remedies for trespass and false arrest. That model fell
apart because the Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to
the states in 1961. Begin, then, with the advent of the distinctively
federal law of search and seizure as it arose in the years that span the
gap between Boyd and Mapp.
Initially, the Supreme Court did not interpret Boyd to require
suppression of illegally-seized evidence. In Adams v. New York,
police searched the defendant's office pursuant to a warrant and
seized illegal "policy slips," or lottery tickets. 9 They also seized
letters, which were used at the trial both as handwriting exemplars
and as admissions of ownership of the policy slips."6 The Court
without dissent held that Boyd did not require exclusion of illegally
seized evidence,' 6' and so it was not necessary to determine whether
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fourth."a

158. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 787 ("The confusion began with
the Supreme Court's landmark 1886 case, Boyd v. United States.") (footnote omitted); id.
at 791 (Boyd theory of Fourth/Fifth amendment fusion is "Lochner-eraproperty-fetishism,
dressed up as a textual argument"); Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at
916 (Boyd was "the godfather of Counselman");id. at 927-928 (indicating that Schmerber,
Kastigar,and inevitable discovery doctrine presage use-only immunity defended by Amar
& Lettow).
159. 192 U.S. 585, 586-88 (1904).
160. Id.at 594.
161. Id.at 598. Note that in admitting this evidence, the Court seemed to think it

significant that the original "invasion of the sanctity of the home" was not unlawful. Id.
162. Id. at 594.
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In the ground-breaking Weeks decision, the defendant's home
was searched twice following his arrest, once by local police and once
by local police accompanied by the U.S. Marshal."6 Justice Day
once again wrote for a unanimous Court, but this time held that the
defendant's pretrial motion for the return of his property-the papers
showing his guilt of the crime charged-should have been granted,
with the practical effect (given the Boyd limit on the subpoena power)
of suppression."6 Adams was distinguished, unconvincingly, on
procedural grounds; an objection at trial was unseasonable, while a
pretrial motion for return of property was timely." The Weeks
Court also noted that in Adams the police had a warrant; but if
the evidence in Adams were untainted the Court could have avoided
both the exclusionary rule issue and the incorporation issue. 67
There is another, better explanation for the flip-flop than those
given by the Weeks Court. Adams was a state case, in which the
defendant claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the
Fourth to the states. Reversing the conviction would have imposed
the exclusionary rule on the states, a step that the Court would not
take for another fifty-seven years. In Weeks, the Court carefully
distinguished the evidence seized by the local police in the initial
search from the evidence seized later by the U.S. Marshal. Only the
latter had to be returned, "as the Fourth Amendment is not directed
to individual misconduct of [state] officials. Its limitations reach the
Federal Government and its agencies.""
Thus the Weeks Court answered the incorporation issue reserved
in Adams in the negative; the Fourth Amendment holding of Adams
was effectively overruled. That result should not occasion much
surprise. As Wolf v. Colorado'69 suggests, reasonable Justices might
well "stoutly adhere" to the exclusion of tainted evidence in federal
cases without imposing the exclusionary rule on the states. The dual
holding in Weeks-that suppression was required but that the Fourth
Amendment did not bind the states-laid the foundation for the
federal model.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
F. 481,
168.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914).
Id.at 398.
Id.at 396.
Id.
On the basic incompatibility of Adams and Weeks, see Flagg v. United States, 233
486-87 (2d Cir. 1916) (Veeder, J., concurring).
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398 (citing Boyd and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78

(1908)).
169. 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
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After Weeks, the Court could consider federal law enforcement
apart from its vastly larger and more unruly state counterpart. In the
next major case, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,70 the
Court, per Justice Holmes, rejected a self-incrimination or property
theory of the exclusionary rule in favor of denunciation and deterrence.
After an illegal search of the company's premises, federal agents
seized its books and papers. The company's timely motion for return
was granted. But the government then issued a subpoena for the
books and records previously seized illegally-a subpoena which could
not be resisted under Boyd because corporate bodies did not enjoy
the privilege against self-incrimination.' 7'
The government pressed the claim that the Weeks remedy was
just another facet of Boyd's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment,
but Holmes wrote that this approach "reduces the FourthAmendment
to a form of words."'
The Fourth-Fifth fusion theory of the
exclusionary rule was not dead; it would soon reappear with baleful
consequences. Silverthorne makes quite clear, however, that the
federal model did not depend solely on self-incrimination. At the
very least, Silverthorne committed the authority of Holmes to the
proposition that deterring and/or denouncing Fourth Amendment
violations justifies the exclusionary rule, independently of rights to
property or against self-incrimination.' 73

Adams, Weeks, and Silverthorne involved the seizure of private
papers of the sort that Boyd had declared immune from compelled
production via subpoena. The return of property theory worked well
enough for papers; it was not at all clear how the theory would work
with physical evidence. Physical evidence lacks any of the communicative features of private papers, and is frequently illegal to possess,
so that no court could grant a motion for a return of the property. In
the cases following Silverthorne, the Court closed the gap between
papers and physical evidence, and in so doing revived the property
and self-incrimination theories. In Gouled v. United States74 the
Court held that entry obtained by the pretense of an undercover
agent works an unreasonable search and that the fruits of that search

170. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
171. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
172. Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added) (citing Weeks).
173. "IT]he rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be
protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way." Id.
174. 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921).
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must be suppressed on self-incrimination grounds under Boyd, at least
so long as private papers constituted the evidence seized. Gouled also
revived the property theory, holding that "mere evidence," as distinct
even under the authority of a
from contraband, could not be seized
175
warrant based on probable cause.
In Agnello v. United States,76 the Court relied on the Fifth
Amendment to suppress cocaine seized during a warrantless home
search. Agnello maintained that the government had fabricated the
story of finding the cocaine in his house; thus, he could not move for
the return of property he claimed he did not own, and which under
the law, he could not own. The return-of-property theory, and with
it the purported distinction between the objection to trial evidence
and a pretrial motion for return of property, therefore had to go. But
it was unfortunate that the Court relied on the Fifth Amendment
rather than a Fourth Amendment deterrence theory. The Fifth
Amendment angle led the Court to the difficult conclusion that the
Boyd rule extends to cocaine as well as to private papers,' 77 and to
the adoption of the standing doctrine that would come to do so much
damage to the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule.' 7
So the Court during the first third of this century adopted various
accounts of the exclusionary rule. But there can be little doubt that
deterrence on the one hand, and federalism on the other, explains the
holdings in the cases. 179 Federalism explains why Adams is not
Weeks and why Weeks reached and rejected the incorporation claim.
Deterrence explains why the lumber company and the cocaine
possessor can invoke the exclusionary rule. And the warrant
requirement, which no justice questioned before Mapp, was simply
assumed.
Why did the Supreme Court reject the settled common-law rule
that tainted evidence is admissible? In the Weeks case, Justice Day
casually noted that the common-law rule "has the sanction of so many

175. Id.at 309.
176. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
177. Id.at 33-35.

178. See id,
at 35 ("But the judgment against the other defendants may stand. The
introduction of the evidence of the search and seizure did not transgress their
constitutional rights.").
179. For alternative interpretations of the early cases, see Gerard V. Bradley, Present
at the Creation?A CriticalGuide to Weeks v. United States and Its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1031 (1986); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest on
a "PrincipledBasis"Rather than an "EmpiricalProposition"?,16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565,

590-97 (1983).
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state cases that it would be impracticable to cite or refer to them in
detail."'" That could only be so if the tort suits assumed by the
Fourth Amendment's framers were, for one reason or another, failing
to deter violations. What was needed was a new remedy for an old
wrong, and in Weeks, Silverthorne, and Agnello the Court fashioned
that remedy.
Federalism, meanwhile, enabled the Court to insist on rigorous
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. The warrant requirement
was taken with utmost seriousness, but the Supreme Court developed
the requirement in the context of home or workplace invasions, and
took it no further than that. Undercover agents could not obtain
valid consent to search by deception; and mere evidence could not be
seized at all. The federal model was so generous to the suspect that
in the years following Mapp8 even the liberal Warren Court felt
compelled to undo most of it. 1
The unfortunate feedback from this rigorous model was that the
Court in the Olmstead case adopted a narrow definition of "searches
and seizures."' "m Given Gouled's prohibition of exploiting the
suspect's ignorance and of seizing mere evidence, equating eavesdropping with Fourth Amendment "searches" might have amounted to
forbidding electronic surveillance altogether.Y So the propertybased conception of the amendment prevailed-but the selfincrimination approach distinctly did not. So long as private papers,
correspondence included, were shielded from discovery under Boyd,
private conversations would seem equally entitled to protection) 84
180. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 396 (1914).
181. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (refusing to give Mapp retroactive
effect; implicitly but conclusively rejecting Fifth Amendment rationale for exclusionary
rule); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that conversations with spy
after entry consented to without knowledge of informant's arrangement with authorities
admissible); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that Fifth Amendment
privilege does not protect physical evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
(holding that Fourth Amendment does not forbid searches for mere evidence).
182. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
183. Statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy would not be mere evidence, but
any retrospective reference to completed offenses would be mere evidence. And if one
who admits a caller can suppress papers seized during a brief absence from the room,
telephone users with no reason at all to suspect eavesdroppers could suppress recordings
of their conversations. Thus the Olmstead majority wrote that "Gouled v. United States
carried the inhibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to the extreme limit. Its
authority is not to be enlarged by implication and must be confined to the precise state of
facts disclosed by the record." Id.at 463.
184. Olmstead is famous now chiefly for the eloquent dissenting opinions of Holmes
and Brandeis-opinions that illustrate how justices with powerful intellects and consistent
principles can indeed overcome the emotional reluctance to affirm civil liberty by releasing
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Thus there was nothing terribly ahistorical about either the
warrant requirement or the exclusionary rule. Just as Professor Amar
believes that changes in technological circumstances inform
constitutional interpretation, as with electronic surveillance, 185 so
changes in the legal environment need to be taken into account. If
the state tort actions that provided the traditional remedy for false
arrest and trespass had become ineffective against modem police
departments, the federal courts were duty-bound to find some
effective substitute for the remedy the framers had presupposed.
To make this point concrete, suppose that in the late nineteenth
century a state had passed a statute simply abolishing the commonlaw torts of trespass and false imprisonment. The statute would have
priority over state common-law, so in this state federal officers simply
could not be sued for violations of the Fourth Amendment. The only
way for a federal court to prevent wholesale Fourth Amendment
violations would be to: (1) create a constitutional tort remedy; or (2)
declare the state statute unconstitutional; or (3) recognize the
exclusionary rule. All of these responses would be innovative, but the
exclusionary rule would really be no more so than the other two.
The warrant requirement, as such, first appears as dicta in an
1876 opinion by Justice Field.8 6 But the warrant requirement for
residential searches was not simply invented. The common-law
trespass action was a strict liability affair."
A warrant was a

an acknowledged criminal. See id. at 470 ("We have to choose, and for my part I think
it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an
ignoble part.") (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 479 ("And it is also immaterial that the
intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.") (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
185. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 798 ("Time-honored rules of
trespass need to be supplemented to deal with new technology like wiretapping, as the
Court held in Katz.") (footnote omitted). Professor Amar then goes on in the same
passage to suggest corresponding modernization of legal remedies-confined to damage
actions.
186. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1876).
187. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *208-15.
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so

minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my
license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing; which is
proved by every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called upon to
answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil. If he admits the

fact, he is bound to shew by way of justification, that some positive law has
empowered or excused him.
Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765).
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defense, but reasonableness was not."s Judge Cooley made the
trespass-based warrant requirement explicit: "The only lawful mode
of making search upon one's premises is under the command of
search warrants . ..

.""s

Evidence of reasonableness was received

in mitigation of damages only."9 Amar is quite right that the
function of search warrants was to cut off liability for trespass. He is
wrong, however, when he asserts that "if the jury deemed the search
or seizure unreasonable-and reasonableness was a classic jury question-the citizen plaintiff would win and the official would be obliged
to pay (often heavy) damages."' 9 ' Amar is confusing trespass with
negligence in a way that his sources do not."
188. Reasonableness might mitigate damages, but it would not negate liability. See 3
supra note 187:
But the law of England... has treated every entry upon another's lands (unless
by the owner's leave, or in some very particular cases) as an injury or wrong, for
satisfaction of which an action of trespass will lie; but determines the quantum of
that satisfaction, by considering how far the offence was wilful or inadvertent, and
by estimating the value of the actual damage sustained.
Id.at *209. As Judge Cooley put it, "Absence of bad faith can never excuse a trespass,
though the existence of bad faith may sometimes aggravate it. Every one must be sure of
his legal right when he invades the possession of another." Cubit v. O'Dett, 16 N.W. 679,
683 (Mich. 1883). Thus in Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1154 (C.P. 1763), the
defense sought to prove that Wilkes was in fact guilty of criminal libel, but this was
admissible on the question of damages, not on the question of liability. The Solicitor
General argued to the jury that if Wilkes
should be proved to be the author of that paper, which he was confident he
should be able to prove, to the full satisfaction of the court and jury; in that case,
so far from thinking him worthy of exemplary damages, he was certain they
would view him in his true and native colours, as a most vile and wicked
incendiary, and a sower if dissention amongst his majesty's subjects.
Id.at 1159.
189. THOMAS COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 295 (1880) (emphasis added).
190. See Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 509 (1844); Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 285
(1816).
BLACKSTONE,

191. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 774 (footnote omitted).
192. Amar asserts that "[t]here is considerable evidence veriFying the reasonableness
role of the civil jury in search and seizure cases throughout the nineteenth century. Here
I shall present only a smattering." Id at 818 n.228. He then cites:
(a) Counsel's argument in Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 509, 517 (1844), for the
proposition that "it is further a rule that the circumstances which would render a search
reasonable are for the jury to judge." The court, however, did not adopt counsel's
submission. The Simpson court reversed, but only because evidence showing reasonable
suspicion was admissible in mitigation of damages only. AL at 520-24;
(b) The dissenting opinion of Justice Woodbury in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849). In Luther, the Supreme Court threw out a trespass action on political
question grounds, because the justification claimed by the defendants was that they were
acting under martial law, declared at a popular convention because of an attempt to
replace the old state government. The dissenting opinion states only that a jury should
award damages for home invasion "unless a justification is made out fully on correct
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Now maybe Amar is saying that because reasonableness might
reduce the jury's damage award to less than the cost of suit, the
trespass action recognized a de facto reasonableness defense. But he
himself heavily emphasizes the generosity of the jury awards in the
North Briton affair and argues that the framers would have assumed
that such damages would be available."9 If the framers of the

principles," id.at 87 (Woodbury, J., dissenting), which in trespass would have required
consent or a valid warrant. Woodbury continues to say that if the defendants committed
trespass "from patriotism, and with proper decorum and humanity, the legislature will, on
application, usually indemnify them by discharging from the public treasury the amount
recovered for any injury to individual rights." id (Woodbury, J., dissenting). This is a
dissenting opinion, in a case that arose from a virtual civil war, in which martial law had
been declared; and yet all the opinion asserts is that reasonableness might be grounds for
indemnification from the legislature. The plaintiff would still collect damages, but maybe
the state, rather than the defendants, would pay them. Id.at 88 (Woodbury, J.,
dissenting);
(c) Allen v. Colby, 47 N.H. 544 (1867). The plaintiff sued the defendants for trespass
to chattels, not for trespass to real property. Id. at 544-46. In Allen, the plaintiff, Allen,
in 1862, was bent on evading the Civil War draft, and had packed his clothes for the
purpose of fleeing to Canada. Id. The defendants, the sheriff and a deputy, went to the
house of one Hawley to arrest Allen. But Allen had fled, leaving behind his clothes in a
valise. Id. The sheriff seized the valise. After the war, Allen returned from Canada and
demanded the return of his clothes, which Colby refused. Allen then sued. Id.
The court held that the "provision of the constitution against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be understood to prohibit a search or seizure, made in attempting to
execute a military order authorized by the constitution and a law of Congress, when the
jury under correct instructions from the court, have found that the seizure was proper and
reasonable, as they have in this case." Id.at 549. Amar omits the court's reference to the
authorization of Congress and the military order. The court can be read as saying that
these supply, at least in wartime, the positive legal justification that a search warrant would
ordinarily provide. Alternatively, the court can be read as saying that the seizure of the
valise was an appropriate step to effect Allen's arrest, for which of course no warrant
would be required. Finally, it is worth noting that there was no home invasion. The court
took pains to note:
The case does not find, and there is no evidence reported, from which it can be
inferred, that the defendants broke into Hawley's house, or committed any other
wrong in order to obtain possession of the plaintiff's valise and clothing. The
authorities have, therefore, no application in which it has been held that property
cannot be taken on a legal warrant, if possession of the property was first
obtained by a wrongful act.
Id.There is thus no suggestion in Allen that even in wartime a jury would have discretion
to award no damages for a warrantless home invasion;
(d) A 1908 jury instruction manual directing courts that officers do not need a warrant
to arrest. 2 FREDERICK SACKETr, BRICKWOOD'S SACKET ON INSTRUCIONS TO JURIES
§ 2449(a) (3d ed. 1908). I fail to see how this is germane; the common-law authorized
warrantless arrests of felons; the civil action for trespass was distinct from the action for
false imprisonment.
193. Amar, Fourth Amendment, suvra note 15, at 815 ("Presumed damages are
especially appropriate in Fourth Amendment cases, given Lord Camden's explicit embrace
of an award of 300 pounds to a journeyman printer.").
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Fourth Amendment assumed that trespass actions would provide the
remedy and that juries would award generous damages, then they
intended a de facto warrant requirement for home searches as well.
With the decline of the tort remedy, excluding the fruits of warrantless home searches became necessary to enforce that requirement.
The Court constructed this federal model of the Fourth
Amendment in the fourteen years between Weeks and Olmstead. The
model functioned without fundamental disagreement among the
Justices for another thirty years, in marked contrast to the sharp
divisions in the confessions cases. Because the substantive criminal
vagrancy laws allowed the police to arrest for mere suspicion, 94 the
search-incident-to-arrest exception exempted street encounters from
the warrant requirement. Whatever regulatory inspections the federal
government conducted did not provoke litigation. Thus the recurring
government activities that would ultimately force the demise of the
federal model after Mapp put no pressure on the prevailing Fourth
Amendment paradigm.
Mapp suddenly made the federal model practically, as well as
nominally, binding on state law enforcement, which is to say the real,
day-to-day world of cops and robbers. Then and only then did
constitutional standards matter to state and local police, thus making
the demise of the federal model only a matter of -time.
Given the fact that local police routinely engage in coercive street
encounters, the federal model was living on borrowed time. The
invalidation of the vagrancy ordinances made some accommodation
between street encounters and the Fourth Amendment more
urgent, 95 but even if the vagrancy laws remained valid the warrant
requirement could not survive the application of the exclusionary rule
to the states. For one thing, in many cases, even when the substantive
criminal law conferred authority to arrest on suspicion, the arrest was
often incident to a search of the person rather than the other way
around. Even if a creative legal theory could have harmonized street
encounters with the federal model, no theory however creative could
harmonize that model with state and local building inspections.

194. See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
603, 614 (1956).
195. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), did not come until four
years after Terry. But well before Terry, litigants had successfully challenged vagrancy
ordinances on constitutional grounds. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S.
87, 93-95 (1965); Annotation, 25 A.L.R.3d 792, 792-826 (1969) (collecting cases from lower

courts).
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In 1967, the Court dealt with the building inspection problem, 96
and in 1968 turned to street encounters.' 7 In both contexts, the
Court did what Professor Amar urges-reduce the Fourth
Amendment analysis into an inquiry into reasonableness.198 The
Terry Court, however, recognized that the stop-and-frisk is a
distinctive, recurring category of police behavior." 9 The Court
gradually crafted a general standard of justification-what became
known as the reasonable suspicion standard-for this category of
police operations.
In applying the CamaralTerry balancing test, the Court has
consistently expressed hostility to official discretion. 2 ' Restraint
and inquiry based on particularized suspicion, or pursuant to a
mandatory general policy, are favored over random or discretionary
intrusions. In a real sense the Court has come full circle from Wolf,
for incorporation of the Fourth Amendment has meant no more than
that government agents act reasonably, and the determinants of
reasonableness resonate with due process rather than with any values
peculiar to the restriction of searches and seizures.2 2
196. Camara v. Municipal Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
197. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
198. In Camara,the Court reasoned that what must be probable is cause, not the actual
presence of evidence; the rest was easy:
Having concluded that the area inspection is a 'reasonable' search of private
property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that
'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative
or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling.
387 U.S. at 538.. Similar reasoning prevailed in Terry:
But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be,
subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case
must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (footnote omitted).
199. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27.
200. See 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3 (2d ed. 1987). On the
desirability of discrete categories of Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as distinct from case-bycase reasonableness analysis, see two Fourth Amendment classics-Anthony Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 387-91 (1974); Wayne
LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV. 40, 56-59 (1968).
201. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,454 (1990); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1978).
202. CompareBerger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) with Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). In Berger, the Court, operating without the option of the
Terry balancing test, struck down a New York statute authorizing court-ordered electronic
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The treatment of the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court
shows how fundamentally ahistorical Amar's Fourth Amendment
analysis is. On his account, the exclusionary rule became an
anachronism after Schmerber because the rule was rooted in the
fusion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments which was embraced by
Boyd and by the Brandeis dissent in Olmstead.' But Mapp v.
Ohio,' decided three years before Malloy v. Hogan, 5 applied
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states.
Justice Black provided the fifth vote in Mapp, and relied on the selfincrimination theory. 6 Potter Stewart, however, withheld his
opinion on the exclusionary rule question because the issue was not
properly before the Court, and supported the Mapp result on
deterrence grounds.' Moreover, the Court applied the exclusionary
rule to the states in cases following Mapp but predating Malloy, which
incorporated the privilege against self-incrimination. For example, an
all-but-unanimous Supreme Court (per Justice Stewart) excluded
tainted evidence in Stoner v. California.°8
The Court did extend the Fifth Amendment privilege to the
states in Malloy, decided in 1964. But it promptly held that Mapp
would not be given retroactive effect-a result explicitly justified on
deterrence grounds and inconsistent with the self-incrimination

surveillance because the statute did not require that an eavesdrop order "particularly
describe" the conversations to be seized. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-59. In Acton, the Court
upheld mandatory drug testing, without particularized suspicion and without warrants,
under the Terry balancing test. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-97. In Berger the focus on the
warrant clause gave the Fourth Amendment distinctive content, Berger,388 U.S. at 49-60;
in Acton the result, and the reasoning, would have been the same under the Due Process
Clause as under the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment, see Acton, 115 S.
Ct. at 2390-97.
203. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 787-91. Amar writes:
Property worship was of course once in vogue, but this aspect of the Lochner era
was supposedly laid to rest in the 1930s. If a person's very blood can be forcibly
taken and used against him because it is not "testimonial"-as Justice Brennan
held for the modem Court in Schmerber-itis hard to understand why his bloody
shirt is entitled to greater protection.
Ia at 788 (footnote omitted).
204. 367 U.S. 643, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
205. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
206. Id. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 672 (Black, J., concurring).
208. 376 U.S. 483, 486-90 (1964). For a restatement of Justice Stewart's views, see
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1380-1404 (1983).
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theory °9 So it seems quite clear that the exclusionary rule did not
rest on the self-incrimination theory prior to Schmerber.
The central fact in the history of the Fourth Amendment in this
century is that Mapp worked a revolution in local police
operations, ° just as the central fact of Fourth Amendment history
in the nineteenth century is the rise of modern police forces and the
corresponding atrophication of the tort remedy.21' If effective civil
remedies carried the political appeal that would commend them to
legislators, those remedies would have forced the police to comply
with the Amendment in the days between Wolf and Mapp; Mapp
would have discomfited the police but little. Without Mapp, Boyd
might even now be the law, while Hoffa, Robinson, Ross, and Belton
might not be. Without Mapp, there would have been no disingenuous
judicial reaction against the exclusionary rule of the sort initiated by
the Burger Court's decision in Calandra.
Those who recognize the pivotal significance of Mapp will
understand how Fourth Amendment law has grown so complex.
Rather than scrap the federal model, the Justices have sought to
accommodate the old model to the imperatives of state law enforcement. To do this, they recognized discrete categories of police tactics
that are wholly unregulated by the Fourth Amendment because they
are not searches or seizures, discrete categories of police searches and
seizures that require neither warrants nor probable cause and
categories of acceptable uses for tainted evidence. All three of these
209. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) ("The misconduct of the police
prior to Mapp has already occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners
involved.").
210. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in FailingHealth? Some New
Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 708-11 (1974)
(illustrating impact of Mapp on police behavior with data on increase in search warrants
obtained by police after the decision); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule: An
EssentialIngredient of the Fourth Amendment, 1983 SuP. Cr. REv. 283, 293 (noting that
"[b]efore the Mapp decision, search warrants were virtually unknown and unused writs in
many states having no exclusionary rules of their own"); Yale Kamisar, On the Tactics of
Police-ProsecutionOriented Criticsof the Courts,49 CORNELL L. REv. 436,440-46 (1964)
(describing police reactions to tighter enforcement of restrictions on their power); Tracey
Maclin, When the Curefor the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1, 71-72 (1994) (describing changes in police procedures after Mapp).
New York City Police Commissioner Michael Murphy described the effect of Mapp

as "dramatic and traumatic," and compared the Warren Court's criminal cases to "tidal
waves and earthquakes." Michael J. Murphy, JudicialReview of Police Methods in Law
Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEx. L. REv. 939,
941 (1966).
211. See Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About FirstPrinciples,107 HARv. L. REv. 820,
830-38 (1994).
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processes began with the Warren Court, but the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have carried them much further.
It is this proliferation of categories that gives Fourth Amendment
law its chaotic appearance, while all that remains of the old model is
that if police search a home or office without a warrant, any evidence
they discover will be excluded from the government's case-in-chief at
the trial of the search victim. Professor Amar is willing to bury this
last remnant of the old model, but it is hard to see why. However
confusing the Fourth Amendment is to lawyers, it is not terribly
confusing to police officers.212
The applicable law can be restated clearly enough:
(1) Police need a warrant founded on probable cause, or
probable cause and exigent circumstances that justify
proceeding without a warrant, or consent, to search a
for evidence or for a nonresident they
home or office 213
desire to arrest.
(2) Police need an arrest warrant founded on probable
cause to arrest a suspect at his home; they need
probable cause, but no warrant, to arrest in public 14
(3) Police need probable cause, but no warrant, to search
an automobile and any container within an automobile;
the search, however, may not extend to areas where the
suspected evidence could not be concealed. 1 5 Pursuant to an established policy, any impounded vehicle
may be searched to inventory the contents, and containers in the car may be searched as well. 6
(4) Incident to a lawful arrest, the police may, without
probable cause or a warrant, search:

212. Police manuals manage to capture the essentials in remarkably few pages. See,
e.g., RONALD CARLSON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURE 13-52 (3d ed. 1985) (covering

arrest and search). The law has since then been made even simpler for police. For
example, the Acevedo decision means that, outside a building, the only time the police
need a warrant to search a container, such as a suitcase or a backpack, is when the
container is in the possession of a pedestrian whom the police do not yet have probable
cause to arrest. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-81 (1991).
213. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323-29 (1987); Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 208-23 (1981).
214. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-603 (1980); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 414-25 (1976); 2 LAFAVE § 5.1(b), at 397-405, supra note 200.
215. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570-72; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809-17 (1982).
216. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,371-77 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 367-76 (1976).
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(a) the person of the suspect, including any217clothing
or containers in the suspect's possession;
(b) the passenger compartment of the car the
suspect was in, if the arrest took place on the
road;-"'
(c) the immediate area, if the suspect was arrested
indoors.219
(5) Without a warrant or probable cause, but with
reasonable suspicion, the police may detain a pedestrian
or a motorist for investigation, 2 0 and, if specific facts
suggest the suspect may be armed, the police may frisk
the suspect to enable the investigation to proceed in
safety221
So the warrant requirement is now pretty clearly confined to
private premises.' While probable cause is not reducible to rules,
"in the ordinary case the probable cause standard is likely to be fairly
'
predictable to those who must apply it."
224
The distinctions in the exclusionary rule cases are arbitrary,
but that hardly calls for abandoning the exclusionary rule. The Court
should modify the exclusionary rule cases by (a) eliminating or
liberalizing the Fourth Amendment standing doctrine ' and by (b)
replacing the current set of exceptions (good faith, impeachment,

217. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,263-66 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 224-35 (1973).
218. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-62, reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 950 (1981).
219. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-68, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
220. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-32 (1990); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-27
(1968).
221. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-49 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
59-68 (1968).
222. One can still construct a hypothetical case in which the warrant requirement
applies outside private premises. Suppose the police have probable cause to believe that
an innocent pedestrian messenger is carrying a parcel of cocaine. They have no probable
cause to arrest, and, while Acevedo would permit a search of the parcel if the messenger
boards a vehicle, so long as he does not the police might still need a warrant to search the
parcel. But the scenario, while it will no doubt someday be litigated, is quite uncommon.
223. William J. Stuntz, Warrantsand FourthAmendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881,
897 (1991).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-37, reh'g denied 448 U.S. 911
(1980) (papers stolen by federal agents during burglary of accountant's hotel room
admissible against taxpayer, who had no standing to invoke exclusionary rule); United
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,624-29, reh'gdenied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980) (tainted evidence
admissible to impeach statements made by defendant but elicited by the government on
cross-examination).
225. See People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855, 858-59 (Cal. 1955); 5 WAYNE LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.3(h), at 212-19 (2d ed. 1987).
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preliminary proceeding, etc.) with a single "probable lawful discovery"
Such an exception would admit illegally-obtained
exception.
evidence, in any procedural context, if and only if the government
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the police would
have obtained the evidence in compliance with Fourth Amendment
standards, but for the violation.
Such an approach would rationalize the exclusionary rule cases.
The rule would then do no more than restore the constitutional status
quo ante, which would help to reduce the rhetorical disadvantage of
relying on criminals as private attorneys general. It would come
closer to a rational evaluation of the appropriate sanction than any
plausible alternative.
Amar's alternative is a strong presumption of inevitable discovery, counting on legislatures and juries to set damages high enough to
deter illegality. He asserts:
Given the almost metaphysical difficulties in knowing
whether the bloody knife or some evidentiary substitute
would have come to light anyway, should not the law
strongly presume that somehow, some way, sometime, the
truth would come out? Criminals get careless or cocky;
conspirators rat; neighbors come forward; cops get lucky; the
truth outs; and justice reigns-or so our courts should
presume, and any party seeking to suppress truth and thwart
justice should bear a heavy burden of proof' m
The supporting footnote is doctrinal, not empirical. It had to be.
The Department of Justice reports that only 20% of crimes
known to police are cleared by arrest; for violent crimes the figure is
12.8%. 7 Only about half of these arrests end in conviction.'
These numbers, of course, leave out drug sales which are not reported
to the police, and in which the drugs, had they not been seized
illegally, typically would have been sold or destroyed. There is
nothing metaphysical about the causation issue; in most instances the
police can't make a case. 9 Exclusion may not restore the constitu226. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 794 (footnote omitted).
227. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS

1993, at 453 tbl. 4.26 (1994).
228. See, e.g., Brian Forst, Criminal Justice System Measurement of Performance, in
2 ENCY. CRIME & JUSTICE 479, 481 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
229. This is not to say that crime pays. In one sense, Amar is right when he says that
justice prevails most of the time; repeat criminals will eventually get caught. But that is
a far cry from asserting that most crimes get punished. We tolerate low clearance rates
because success in a single crime does not materially reduce the long-run likelihood that
repeat offenders will be convicted of another offense. Given its benefits, we should
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tional status quo ante in every case, but in the vast majority of cases
it does just that.
Amar suggests that ex post compensation could make a search
reasonable."0 This suggestion neglects the important principle that
substantive Fourth Amendment rights are themselves prophylactic.
Some percentage of searches that are unreasonable ex ante will turn
out, ex post, to discover evidence, just as some percentage of searches
that are reasonable ex ante will turn out, ex post, to discover no
evidence. The Amendment, however, condemns every example of
unreasonable searches, even those that turn out to discover
evidence2 1
Professor Amar seems to accept this account of Fourth
Amendment rights when he calls for punitive damages for Fourth
Amendment violations. He would, I suppose, object to allowing the
prosecution to use peremptory strikes to purge the jury of blacks and
Hispanics because the government stood willing to pay the excused
jurors their damages0 2 The exclusionary rule is as natural a
constitutional remedy as reversing the conviction of a white defendant
because the prosecution discriminated against blacks during jury
selection. 3 The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, after all, is
unique in providing a textual escape hatch contingent on compensation.

tolerate the exclusionary rule in the same spirit.
230. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 807.
231. See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 920 (1986):
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not the defeat of certain criminal laws,
but the protection of the lawful enjoyment of privacy ....
With respect to a
particular case, the actual existence of the evidence satisfies the value judgment
struck by the Amendment....

This does not mean that any successful search is legal, because there is no
way to protect lawful privacy without also protecting criminal privacy. The
search without probable cause, however, is objectionable not because it
discovered evidence, but because it represents an official practice likely to intrude
upon the lawful enjoyment of privacy. A due regard for the deterrent function
of a Fourth Amendment remedy adequately responds to the illegality of such an
official practice.

(footnotes omitted).
232. Actual damages would probably be negative, heightening the absurdity.
233. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404-16 (1991). For the comparison with the
exclusionary rule, see Daniel Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffsand Defendantsas PrivateAttorneys General,88 COLUM.

L. REV. 247, 260-62 (1988) (discussing deterrence rationale underlying Supreme Court
cases permitting defendants to challenge convictions on ground that indicting grand jury

was selected in violation of Equal Protection Clause).
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Compared to Amar's alternative-damages set by legislatures and
juries plus a strong presumption of inevitable discovery-the
exclusionary rule is a model of reason. Given the politics of law-andorder, Amar's approach would likely result in legislatures and juries
inviting the police, in certain neighborhoods, to engage in precisely
what the founders so abhorred-general, house-to-house searches.
For example, when the ACLU sued the Chicago public housing
authority to enjoin warrantless, unit-to-unit searches at the Robert
Taylor Homes, the tenant's council approved of the searches, and
many of the residents intervened in the litigation on behalf of the
government. 3
Under Amar's regime, broader police searches would invade the
privacy of many innocent people, and discover much evidence of
crime. The evidence would almost always be admitted, for who can
prove that the police wouldn't have gotten "lucky"? The search
victims-or at least the bolder and angrier victims- would then sue.
If their damages were of the " 'ruinous,' " "heavy" 5 sort Amar
advocates some of the time, then the damage action would have
prospective effect at least as adverse to law enforcement as exclusion.
If their damages were only the "compensation" he advocates at other
times," or if juries really disregarded the privacy of the poor,27
then we would be back to the 1940's.
In short, the exclusionary rule cases are in disarray not because
of the rule's admitted limitations, but because the Justices since
Calandra have lacked the clear understanding and unflinching
determination of Holmes and Brandeis. Amar argues that this proves
that the exclusionary rule is unsustainable, z 8 but even the Rehnquist
Court has found it politically acceptable to preserve the exclusionary
rule in its central application. 9 It is also worth noting that the
Court has not been dramatically more receptive to tort suits brought
by innocent parties than it has been to the exclusionary rule. In the

234. See Erika George, Recent Development-The Fourth Amendment's Forcing of
Flawed Choices: Giving Content to Freedom for Residents of Public Housing-Prattv.
Chicago Housing Authority, 848 F Supp. 792 (N.D. IlL 1994), 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.

577, 581-82 (1995).
235.
236.
237.
238.

Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 812.
E.g., id. at 807-08.
On this possibility, see Maclin, supra note 210, at 29-31.
Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 800 ("In the long run, popular

sentiment will (quite literally) have its day in court, for the people elect Presidents, who
in turn appoint federal judges.").
239. E.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
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tort cases that Amar postulates as more attractive than suppression
motions, the Court has turned aside the pleas of innocent citizens240
and even newspapers. 24'
It may be that any effective remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations is politically unsustainable, and here criminal procedure
scholars might well benefit from an analysis of the role of prudence
in constitutional adjudication. Such analyses have issued from
Yale,242 and I for one would be greatly interested in Amar's views
on prudence in adjudication. Thus far, however, he offers only the
vague idea that the Court should stand aside because the people
ultimately get what they really want.
That notion is not self-evident. It suggests, for instance, that
Plessy v. Ferguson243 and Korematsu v. United States2' were
rightly decided. The Court is indeed politically accountable through
the appointment process, but is nonetheless vastly less accountable
than legislatures. Its purpose in a democratic system is to stand up
for just but unpopular causes.245 There are political limits on how
many such causes any Court can take on, so prudence counsels
choosing them with care. If the Burger Court had backed away from
the exclusionary rule and Miranda because it had taken a new and
unpopular stand for other liberties-for the rights of gay people, 246
say, or imposing either privacy-based or Eighth Amendment limits on
our crazy drug laws 247-- then the unpopularity of the exclusionary
rule might factor into the constitutional analysis. Given, however,
that the Burger Court undertook abortion-on-demand as its principal
240. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,646 (1987); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
557-58 (1967).
241. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978).
242. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH]; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALrrY OF CONSENT (1975); Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of
Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1573-90 (1985).
243. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
244. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). It is of course possible to develop an account of prudence
that avoids the enthusiastic embrace of malicious but widespread popular feelings. Bickel,
for instance, took the view that the Court should not have decided Korematsu at all. See
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 242, at 139.
245. The locus classicus of this view is, of course, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
246. Cf. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901,901 (1976) (no
substantial federal question presented by declaratory judgment suit challenging
constitutionality of criminal sodomy statute).
247. Cf. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 690 (1974)
(upholding forfeiture of pleasure yacht on account of discovery of as little as one joint of
marijuana aboard yacht, after yacht was leased by third parties).

1996]

A CRITIQUE OFAKHIL AMAR

1613

libertarian initiative,248 prudence is a poor apology indeed for
Calandra and its ilk.
Amar's point really suggests the critical question about representation-reinforcement that he never addresses. Which scenario is more
probable-that the Supreme Court can deter Fourth Amendment
violations through the exclusionary rule, or that legislatures can deter
Fourth Amendment violations through meaningful tort remedies? We
know the answer to that question based on the years between Wolf
and Mapp-a point that can be illustrated with a vignette entitled
"The Education of Roger Traynor."
Traynor began his judicial career as hostile to the exclusionary
rule as Amar. In People v. Gonzales, decided in 1942, he wrote an
opinion reaffirming the admissibility of tainted evidence 49 But
experience changed his mind. The tort remedy had become ineffectual, and not solely because of official immunity. The police
consistently disregarded the Fourth Amendment. In one California
case, the police forcibly pumped the stomach of a man who had
swallowed morphine pills when the police entered his bedroom, at
night, without a warrant"z0 In another case, the police, without a
warrant, repeatedly broke into the suspect's house to plant a
microphone, moving it at one point into the marital bedroom.2s'
Traynor came to view the exclusionary rule as the only practical
alternative to official lawlessness:
My misgivings about its admissibility grew as I observed
that time after time it was being offered and admitted as a
routine procedure. It became impossible to ignore the
corollary that illegal searches and seizures were also a
routine procedure subject to no effective deterrent; else how
could illegally obtained evidence come into court with such
regularity? It was one thing to condone an occasional
248. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
249. See People v. Gonzales, 124 P.2d 44, 46-49 (Cal. 1942) (Traynor, J.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 657, reh'g denied, 317 U.S. 708 (1942). Traynor's rhetoric was strikingly similar
to Amar's. See id. at 46 ("The defendant may have civil and criminal remedies against the
officers for their illegal acts, but the state is not precluded from using the evidence
obtained thereby.") (citations omitted); id. at 47 ("The fact that an officer acted
improperly in obtaining evidence presented at the trial in no way precludes the court from
rendering a fair and impartial judgment.").
250. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952). In the Supreme Court of
California, Traynor voted to deny a hearing on the conviction in Rochin. See People v.
Rochin, 225 P.2d 913, 913 (Cal. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
251. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1954) (plurality opinion).
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constable's blunder, to accept his illegally obtained evidence
so that the guilty would not go free. It was quite another to
condone a steady course of illegal police procedures that
deliberately and flagrantly violated the Constitution of the
United States as well as the state constitution. 2
In People v. Cahan, 3 he reversed his former view and wrote the
opinion of the California Supreme Court adopting the exclusionary
rule.
We have been compelled ... to reach that conclusion
because other remedies have completely failed to secure
compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of
police officers with the attendant results that the courts
under the old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law
enforcement officers.... Experience has demonstrated,
however, that neither administrative, criminal nor civil
remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and
seizures.'
The defects of the tort remedy did not attend expansive rules of
immunity 5 In Gonzales, Traynor cited with approval a prior
decision recognizing no immunity for police sued in conversion for
seizing chattels.26 The California Supreme Court would later
recognize immunity for police sued for malicious prosecution, but this
ruling did not apply to suits for false arrest. 7 Thus, for conversion,
false arrest, and, we may suppose, in keeping with the general rule,

252. Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large.in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319,
321-22.
253. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
254. Id. at 911-13 (emphasis added).
255. For the contrary view that immunity played a major role in explaining the ineffectiveness of tort remedies, see Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 502-03 (1955). Foote wrote in the immediate
aftermath of White v. Towers but before Dragnav. White (discussed infra note 257), which
helps to explain his characterization of California immunity law as "extreme." Id. at 503.
But immunity was not, even on Foote's account, an independent reason for the failure of
damage remedies. "Even without such an extreme result as California's, the development
of the tort actions has served the same policy end. The measure of damages, defenses and
evidentiary rules which have grown up with them have had the practical effect of
importing a clean hands doctrine into the remedies." Id. at 503-04.
256. Silva v. MacAuley, 26 P.2d 887, 891 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933), cited in People v.
Gonzales, 124 P.2d 44, 46 (Cal. 1942).
257. White v. Towers, 235 P.2d 209, 211-14 (Cal. 1951) (police immunity for malicious
prosecution); Dragna v. White, 289 P.2d 428, 429-30 (Cal. 1955) (no police immunity for
false arrest).
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for trespass,' 8 California police enjoyed no de jure immunity from
tort suits. And Traynor, who owes much of his considerable
reputation to his innovative decisions extending tort liability in other
contexts, would not have despaired of the tort remedy if some quickfix of the immunity rules showed hope of improving the situation.
Traynor had plenty of company on his Fourth Amendment
odyssey. Earl Warren represented the state in the 1942 Gonzales
case. Tom Clark was Harry Truman's Attorney General. They did
not impose the exclusionary rule on the states out of ignorance or
ideology. They decided Mapp the way that they did because, like
Traynor, experience had convinced them that there was no other way
to enforce the Constitution.
So there is nothing inherently arbitrary about the exclusionary
rule. Consistently applied, as most academics and a minority of
justices have long maintained, the rule can be applied without
arbitrary exceptions. For example, Justice Traynor, whose Fourth
Amendment views as a whole are remarkably coherent and sensible,' 9 wrote a clear-headed opinion recognizing third-party
standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. ° And simply admitting
openly what is now implicit-that there is a home-and-office
exception to the general proposition that neither warrant, consent, nor
emergency is indispensable to Fourth Amendment
reasonableness-would go a long way toward rationalizing the
substantive Fourth Amendment law.
Amar may be right to say that the federal model itself was
unwise and unsupported by constitutional authority. But even if
Boyd, Weeks, and Agnello are all in the spirit of Lochner, the model
those cases established was always contingent on Hurtado. If
Slaughter-House,Hurtado,and Maxwell had gone as Amar wishes, the
federal model would never have been born. The exigencies of state
law enforcement would have precluded it. Those exigencies explain
why Mapp meant the end of the old model, and why the best way to

258. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 210 & cmt. h (1934) (actor has privilege
to enter pursuant to a search warrant if "the order is valid or fair on its face"); WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 89 (1st ed. 1941) ("The defendant is liable for an

intentional entry although he has acted in good faith, under the mistaken belief, however
reasonable, that he is committing no wrong.") (footnote omitted); id. at 154-57 (officer has
privilege to rely on warrant to arrest that is fair on its face).
259. See Gordon Van Kessel, Chief Justice Roger Traynor and The United States
Supreme Court: ContrastingApproaches to Search and Seizure, 25 PAC. L.J. 1235 (1994).
260. People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855, 857-58 (Cal. 1955).
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understand modem Fourth Amendment law is to characterize it as
one long and awkward reaction against Mapp v. Ohio.
2. Amar's Positive Fourth Amendment Program
We come now to Amar's specific prescriptive claims about the
Fourth Amendment. On his view, the touchstone of the Amendment
is reasonableness, and in the main juries rather than judges ought to
determine reasonableness in the context of lawsuits against the
police.26 ' In these lawsuits, the police should enjoy no special
immunities. On the other hand, the absence of a warrant would be
irrelevant to the reasonableness determination. The support for these
proposals is partly historical and partly practical; Amar cautions that
all his proposals cannot be justified independently but must instead
be considered as a package. 62
To this there is a short and decisive reply: Since effective damage
remedies for Fourth Amendment violations will not be adopted by
legislatures, and are beyond the institutional capacity of the judiciary,
Amar's program is a dead letter. It all depends on effective civil
remedies; but no legislature has ever adopted one, and no court has
ever created one.26'
Consider the following proposal for reform:
Whether the tort remedies could develop into such a
measure of control will depend upon the extent to which
they are overhauled in the light of the deterrent objective.
The essential steps in such a process are (1) governmental
liability, (2) provision for minimum liquidated damages, and

261. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 818 (" 'Reasonableness' is largely a
matter of common sense, and the jury represents the common sense of common people.")

(footnote omitted).
262. See supra note 153.
263. See Yale Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in HistoricalPerspective: The Struggle
to Make the FourthAmendment More than "An Empty Blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337,350
(1979). Professor Kamisar stated:
Wolf established the "underlying constitutional doctrine" that "the Federal
Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures by state officers" (though it did not require exclusion of the
resulting evidence); Irvine warned that if the states "defaulted and there were no
demonstrably effective deterrents to unreasonable searches and seizures in lieu
of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court might yet decide that they had not
complied with 'minimal standards' of due process." But neither Wolf nor Irvine
stimulated a single state legislature or a single law enforcement agency to
demonstrate the problem could be handled in other ways.

Id.(footnotes omitted).
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(3) restriction of the "clean hands" defenses which today
keep most potential plaintiffs from going to court.26
That was written a few years before Akhil Amar was born, in an
article widely-regarded as a classic treatment. Caleb Foote's
recommendations, however, have never been adopted.
A quarter century ago, the Chief Justice of the United States
sounded another call for reform: "Congress should develop an
administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself
to afford compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated."2' 6 Warren Burger passed
away last summer, and Congress has done nothing to create a damage
remedy assessed by an administrative agency.
More than a decade ago, Judge Posner wrote:
If... punitive damages are awarded in proper cases, if
judges deal firmly with jury prejudice, if imagination is used
in valuing intangible items of damage such as loss of mental
repose, and if class-action treatment and injunctive relief are
granted in appropriate cases, then, I believe, the tort remedy
will bring us closer to optimum deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations than the exclusionary rule.'
Now Amar is calling for much the same as Foote, Burger, and Posner.
What makes him think it will ever happen?
The problem is not simply that civil remedies give police
disincentives to abusing the respectable and the prosperous but not to
abusing the poor and unpopular. 26 The problem is not simply that
it is very difficult to evaluate appropriate damages for Fourth
Amendment violations.2 " Personal injury suits present some similar

264. Foote, supra note 255, at 514.
265. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
266. Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the FourthAmendment, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 49,68.

267. See Foote, supra note 255, at 504-07 (noting that plaintiff's criminal record can be
admitted to impeach credibility and to mitigate damages).
268. See Stuntz, supra note 223:

The harms that flow from illegal searches and seizures are mostly intangible and
diffuse and therefore hard for the legal system to price accurately. This valuation
difficulty, together with some other problems common to damages actions against
government officials, makes it very hard for the system to avoid seriously overor underdeterring police misconduct.
Id. at 882-83. ComparePosner, supra note 266, at 50-53 (tort damages should not include
search victim's prosecution and conviction with evidence discovered) and John C. Jeffries,
Jr. Damagesfor ConstitutionalViolations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional
Torts, 75 VA. L. REv. 1461,1474-75 (1989) (same) with Arval A. Morris, The Exclusionary
Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REv. 647, 662
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problems. Such problems are real, but I have little doubt that it is
technically feasible to create effective civil remedies for Fourth
Amendment violations. It is not, however, politically feasible.
When Professor Amar persuades Senator Hatch to sponsor
legislation that would (a) eliminate good-faith immunity for the
police, (b) establish nontrivial minimum liquidated damages for
Fourth Amendment violations (say $10,000 for an illegal stop, $25,000
for an illegal arrest, and $50,000 for an illegal home invasion), and (c)
(1982) ("Clearly, Posner's suggestion of the cost of an illegal search-the victim's lost time
in cleaning up-doesn't even begin to cope with the actual social costs created by illegal
searches and seizures.") and Jeffries, supra:
If, however, compensation were limited to constitutionally relevant injury (i.e.,
the invasion of privacy), recoveries might be so modest that law enforcement
authorities would tend to regard them merely as a cost of doing business....
Ultimately, the question is empirical, but risk seems great that a strictly
compensatory remedy would be instrumentally inadequate.
Id at 1476.
Posner, Jeffries, and Morris all accept the idea that, because the substantive criminal
law forbade the search victim's crime, his losses due to prosecution are not cognizable.
Posner and Jeffries further maintain, and Morris does not deny, that society's gains from
prosecution ought to be counted. These two positions contradict one another. When
police seize and destroy a hundred thousand dollars worth of cocaine, we do not describe
that as a welfare loss because the law forbids deriving utility from cocaine. But doesn't
the law also forbid deriving utility from unreasonable searches? See Dripps, supra note
231, at 920; Meltzer, supra note 233, at 260, 267-69 (characterizing Fourth Amendment
rights as prophylactic in nature). To say that the search target has no right to the
contraband is not to say that the government has a right to search his house. One might
as well say that the presence of the contraband gives the police a justification for lying
under oath that the suspect consented to the search. Posner's argument thus condenses
to the proposition that society's interest in enforcing the criminal code has priority over
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, a proposition I had thought rejected by
Marbury v. Madison. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2(a), at 24-29
(3d ed. 1996) ("[T]he cost argument was rejected when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted." (footnote omitted)).
The exclusionary rule is such an elegant remedy because, when the government's
activity is motivated by the desire for evidence, the rule comes very close to setting the
sanction equal to the government's anticipated gain. The rule will, on this account, still
underdeter for two reasons. First, much illegal police activity does not trigger the rule,
either because the police don't find evidence or they find it but get away with it due to
police perjury, ineffective defense representation, a quick guilty plea, or whatever. Second,
illegally-obtained evidence that is inadmissible is still valuable to the police-strategic
intelligence is thereby acquired about criminal operations, and contraband is taken off the
street. But to say that the rule underdeters is not to say that it should be regarded as a
failure. For a contrasting view of the underdeterrence argument, see Stuntz, supra note
223, at 911 n.66.
The difficulty of the valuation problem, however, interacts with the dynamics of public
choice. Legislatures, lobbied by prosecutors and police, would be extremely unlikely to
adopt the kind of liquidated and punitive damages that alone could make for effective civil
remedies. Far more likely would be a reform bill tailored along Posner's line-one that
paid damages for new hinges and so on.
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provide that either party may introduce polygraph evidence and the
failure of the opposing party to introduce such evidence,269 then it
will be time to talk about building a Fourth Amendment model on
civil remedies. One can only imagine the reaction of the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
let alone the Los Angeles or the Philadelphia or the Chicago
police.27 Certainly Senator Hatch can imagine it.
Who would be in favor of such legislation? Law professors and
civil libertarians. Who would oppose it? Any politician who wants
to be seen as a friend of the police. Who would benefit from such
legislation? Young men, typically black, who are the chief targets of
police excess. Who would lose? Anyone who is either sufficiently old
or sufficiently well-off to be secure from the police but vulnerable to
predatory crime.2 The fortunes of such legislation are easy enough
to predict.272 .
Amar posits the Privacy Protection Act adopted by Congress in
response to the Zurcher case as an example of the kind of remedy he
has in mind. What he does not say is that the Act's protections are
expressly limited to the institutional media-about the strongest
interest group in the political universe.27 Efforts to include other

269. On the desirability of admitting polygraph evidence in suppression hearings, see
United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 430-36 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that per se rule of
inadmissibility of polygraph evidence does not apply to suppression hearings); Donald
Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming) (urging admissibility of polygraph examinations whenever outcome of
suppression motion turns on credibility).
270. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
EmpiricalStudy of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. RaV. 1016, 1051-54 (1987)
(police surveyed favored exclusionary rule over effective tort suits against individual
officers).
271. Thus any effective Fourth Amendment remedy will cause some people to be
victims of crime. The criminal law must make tragic choices. " 'But there is nothing new
in the realization' that Fourth Amendment protections come with a price." Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2404 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
272. For a fuller and more general treatment, see Donald Dripps, CriminalProcedure,
Footnote 4, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn
About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1079 (1993).
273. See id. at 1083-84, stating:
The history and the limited scope of the Privacy Protection Act are
instructive. Third-party searches threaten the privacy of many people, including
accountants, lawyers, social workers, educators, and doctors. Well before
Zurcher, the Court had made clear that the standing requirement would invite
unlawful searches of third-parties who happened to possess evidence of crime by
others. But not until an extremely powerful interest group-the media-became
aroused, was the legislature moved to act. And when it did act, it adopted
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innocent custodians of criminal evidence-lawyers, doctors, and
accountants-were defeated by law enforcement interests. Amar
takes for his norm an exotic exception to the usual practice of lawand-order politics.
If effective tort remedies were adopted, the police would be
unable to obtain much evidence of crime. True, in a few cases
undeterred police would discover evidence that would be admissible
absent the exclusionary rule. The number of these cases, however,
would vary inversely with the effectiveness of the new civil remedies.
And in many cases, the government would deal away valid criminal
charges to escape the bite of the new tort remedies 274-"rubbing our
noses"'275 in the price we pay for the Fourth Amendment, just as
does the exclusionary rule.
Indeed, it might well be the case that truly effective civil
remedies would cause the loss of more evidence than the elimination
of the exclusionary rule would secure. Deterred police might well
refrain from constitutionally permissible searches that would yield
evidence of serious crimes." 6 This might be particularly true given
the radical uncertainty Amar's reliance on jury determinations of
reasonableness would create in the minds of the police.
Again, Amar might say that judges could direct verdicts and so
create categories of police conduct that are reasonable or unreasonable per se. Judges might even direct verdicts based on
whether or not the police had gone through warrant-like screening
procedures. But these per se rules would replicate the complex
categories of current Fourth Amendment law. The law might be
different, but it would be no less complicated.
Thus Amar's whole approach is politically counterfactual. He
ignores what is probably the most prominent thread in contemporary
constitutional law scholarship-the representation-reinforcement
theory of judicial review, reflected in the famous fourth footnote of
protections only for the institutional press, and not for third-parties generally, in
spite of an effort in Congress to provide such broader protection.
Two years after Zurcher, the Supreme Court upheld the admission of
evidence seized by agents who burglarized the hotel room of the target's
accountant. But the Act was never broadened to confer protection on
accountants.

L (footnotes omitted).
274. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,389-91 (1987); The Supreme Court,
1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REv. 310, 311 n.7 (1987).
275. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037
(1974).
276. See Orfield, supra note 270, at 1053-54.
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Carolene Products2" and expounded by John Hart Ely278 and Jesse
Choper.279 The reason why effective civil remedies have never been
adopted is less that they cannot be devised than that they would
protect a small group of citizens from the agents of a large group.
And that is why courts, not legislatures, have to take the lead in
protecting constitutional fights against the police.
The exclusionary rule has great limitations; Earl Warren noted
most of them in Terry v. Ohio.' In particular, the absence of an
effective civil remedy leaves citizens at the mercy of illegal arrest. So
my skepticism about the political prospects for an effective civil
remedy should not be interpreted as hostility to the enterprise. But
if Amar insists on presenting as a package a policy program with an
inherently improbable central component, we have ample reason for
rejecting the package. At least we have good reason to defer
fundamental changes, predicated on an effective tort remedy, until an
effective tort remedy materializes?8 l
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that a truly effective
tort remedy were brought into existence. Under such a regime, the
case for a warrant requirement is stronger, rather than weaker.'
The case for manageable standards for recognizable categories of
cases, as opposed to an opaque standard of reasonableness, would be
stronger too. And even in a regime of meaningful civil sanctions, the
exclusionary rule should be retained for bad-faith searches.
Warrants protect privacy in two ways. First, by imposing a
nontrivial cost ex ante on proposed searches, a warrant requirement
operates to discourage purely speculative intrusions.'
Second, by
forcing the police to record their justification in advance, warrants
limit the ability of police and judges to devise post hoc rationalizations
for the discovery of evidence.'
These protections do not seem
extravagant when the government proposes to invade an especially
sensitive privacy interest-quintessentially, the home.
277. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
278. See ELY, supra note 12, at 73-104.

279. JESSE CHOPER, JuDIcIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 73-79
(1980).
280. See 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1968).
281. Even exclusionary-rule critics Warren Burger and Dallin Oaks agree. See Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Narcotics Bureau, 403 U.S. 388,411-12 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 756 (1970).
282. See Stuntz, supra note 223, at 906.
283. See Dripps, supra note 231, at 923-33.
284. See Stuntz, supra note 223, at 915-18.
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Government entity liability would lead departments to put
pressure on the police to avoid liability-that is the whole point to
entity liability. But the more acute the pressure, the more the
temptation on the part of individual officers to avoid liability either
by perjury or by preliminary authorization. 5 If preliminary
authorization cuts off subsequent liability, as warrants traditionally did
and still do, there is good reason for making it a rigorous and costly
process. On the other hand, if preliminary authorization does not
confer a degree of immunity, then the police would have no incentive
to undertake the process.
Amar recognizes this when he talks about the possibility of
making "preclearance" a condition for reasonableness.26 Given an
effective tort remedy, this would amount to a mere alteration of the
warrant requirement. The tortured history of the warrant requirement, however, would have to be relitigated, this time asking whether
"preclearance" (by a prosecutor? a police supervisor? a judge?) is
essential to the reasonableness of searches of footlockers, automobile
trunks, glove compartments, backpacks and so on.'
So too, the case for "bright lines" is stronger in a tort regime
than in an exclusionary regime. All the police lose from exclusion is
a conviction they might possibly have obtained with more investigation. They stand to lose more from an effective tort remedy. At
the moment, Fourth Amendment law is, from the police standpoint,
reasonably clear. It may be that the cases do not hold water as a
matter of legal reasoning, but their results are readily translatable into
police procedure.'
Professor Amar would undo that considerable achievement.
"Reasonableness" would have to be reworked from the ground up.
285. On the risk that tort remedies would foster more police perjury than the
exclusionary rule, see Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,Perjury, and the Heater Factor:
An ExclusionaryRule in the Chicago CriminalCourts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.75, 126 (1992).
286. Amar, FourthAmendment, supra note 15, at 810, 817.
287. For the flavor of the problem, see United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1174-76
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Tamm, J., dissenting), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
288. Arbitrary rules can be perfectly clear. There may be no reason for the distinction
between a warrantless automobile search based on probable cause (which may extend to
the trunk under United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1981)) and a warrantless automobile
search based on the arrest of the driver (which may not extend to the trunk under New
York v. Belton, 493 U.S. 454 (1981)), but the police can understand the distinction. And
the exclusionary rule cases do not obscure the rules that determine the primary legality of
police conduct. Alternative, more restrictive and coherent rules could be equally easy to

understand and apply. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World. On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PrrT. L. REV.307, 320-33

(1982).
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Maybe the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards would
survive, maybe not. Maybe the residential warrant requirement would
remain, in the form of a "preclearance" requirement, maybe not.
Obliterating prevailing premises would not establish new ones; the
injunction to be reasonable is no more than a command to do good
and avoid evil.
Finally, a regime of civil damages would not justify abolishing the
exclusionary rule. 9 Absent the suppression remedy as a shotgun
in the closet, civil remedies effectively put Fourth Amendment rights
up for sale. Knowing or reckless violations of Fourth Amendment
standards call for exclusion of the fruits, even if damages are also
assessed.
Amar's arguments against the exclusionary rule, as distinct from
those in favor of civil damages, are unpersuasive. The argument that
exclusion is disproportionate is inconsistent with Amar's plea for
punitive damages. The argument that criminal defendants are
unattractive plaintiffs neglects the fact that innocent civil plaintiffs will
come from the same social milieu. No matter what the legal remedy
for illegal searches, the police are not about to toss the house of the
PTA president. Thus, even granting Amar's politically unrealistic
assumption of effective civil remedies, most, if not all, of current
Fourth Amendment law ought to remain in place.
B. The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Professor Amar and Ms. Lettow argue that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination should be interpreted to prohibit
only the use at trial of the defendant's compelled statements.2' ° On
their account, witnesses may be compelled to answer questions in any
proceeding so long as their words are not later received against them
at a criminal trial.29' Even at trial, physical evidence derived from
compelled pretrial testimony should be admitted. 9 Thus, to Amar
and Lettow, the underlying purpose of the privilege is to promote the
reliability of the criminal trial process. 293
289. See Jeffries, supra note 268, at 1476-77; Arnold H. Loewy, The FourthAmendment
as a Device for Protectingthe Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1266 & n.168 (1983); see
also George C. Thomas I & Barry S. Pollack, Balancing the Fourth Amendment Scales:
The Bad-Faith "Exception" to ExclusionaryRule Limitations,45 HASTINGs L.. 21, 24-34
(1993) (arguing that bad-faith violations require a broader exclusionary rule).
290. See Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 858-59.
291. Id.at 898-901.
292. Id. at 909-19.
293. Id. at 922-24.
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The argument is ingenious but utterly unconvincing. At the time
the amendment was adopted, the accused was disqualified, due to
interest, from giving sworn testimony at his own trial.294
Nonetheless, common-law procedure of this era involved questioning
the accused before trial, and the answers so obtained were admitted
in evidence.295 At the trial itself, the accused was obliged to conduct the defense, and so spoke constantly, giving unsworn but
296
nonetheless relevant information to the jurors on a regular basis.
Thus the privilege, as distinct from the common-law confessions
rule, was not inspired by doubts about the reliability of information
given by a witness in jeopardy.2" The criminal justice system of the
framers relied heavily on just such information. The recent historical
scholarship by John Langbein and Eban Moglen, while subject of
course to revision in light of new historical evidence, seems convincing
on this count.
But their work claims only that the privilege played no
meaningful role in common-law criminal trials. 298 There can be no
denying that the privilege was highly regarded by the colonists who
broke from England and by those who drafted the Fifth Amendment.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 includes the privilege,299
as do many state constitutions adopted prior to the federal
Constitution of 1789."0 How could the privilege have been at once
revered and neglected?
The answer seems straightforward enough-the privilege was a
"fighting right" that had to be claimed."' Few if any criminal

294. John H. Langbein, The HistoricalOriginsofthe PrivilegeAgainstSelf-Incrimination
at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (1994).
295. See id. at 1059-62 (English practice); Eban Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsideringthe Origins of the ConstitutionalPrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 1086, 1094-99 (1994) (American practice).
296. See Langbein, supra note 294, at 1048-62.
297. Thus Amar and Lettow err by invoking Blackstone's distrust of confessions as
proof of the unreliability of in-court utterances by the accused. Compare Amar & Lettow,

Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 922-23 with 3

JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 823, at

248-49 (3d ed. 1940) (confessions rule distinct from privilege against self-incrimination:
"The sum and substance of the difference is that the confession-rule aims to exclude selfcriminating statements which are false, while the privilege-rule gives the option of
excluding those which are true.").
298. See Langbein, supra note 294, at 1084; Moglen, supra note 295, at 1089.
299. See Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, § 8, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED

3813 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
300. See LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDmENT 409 (1968).
301. See id. at 375.

STATES

1996]

A CRITIQUE OFAKHIL AMAR

1625

defendants, absent counsel, knew of the privilege or were bold enough
to assert it during examination. The privilege's primary practical role
was to protect political and religious dissent, outside the context of
criminal justice. Amar and Lettow have it exactly backwards. From
the founding to Miranda, the privilege has had to fight its way into
the criminal justice system. To suggest that the privilege cannot be
claimed except by one on trial is to confine the privilege to the only
context in which it was unavailable at the founding.
Eighteenth-century immunity statutes, called "amnesty statutes,"
conferred only transactional immunity, not use immunity.32 The
privilege itself was thought of in terms of whether or not the answer
would incriminate the witness, taking into account immunity statutes,
pardons, statutes of limitations, and so on, all as of the time that the
question was asked. Courts did not compel testimony first, and ask
what use if any could be made of it later. Rather, they insisted that
the privilege holder use it or lose it. The practical effect was that, in
the relatively rare instances in which the privilege was invoked, it
conferred practical immunity not only for the testimony which was not
given, but also for the physical fruits which were not disclosed.
Three prominent examples from legal history illustrate the point.
The first is Wilkes v. Wood, 3 a case Amar makes much of for
Fourth Amendment purposes. The defendants at the trial of this civil
trespass action sought to prove Wilkes, the plaintiff, guilty of criminal
libel, for the purpose of reducing damages. The defendants called as
a witness the printer of the libelous matter. He was in jeopardy of
prosecution for criminal libel, and invoked his privilege. The
defendants vigorously objected, but the court ruled that he was not
bound to answer any question that might incriminate him."

302. See 4 JOHN

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2281, at 3165-84 (1st ed. 1904).
303. 19 Howell's St. Trials 1154 (C.P. 1763).

304. See id at 1162:
Walter Balff says, in the first place, that he is under a recognizance, and
therefore pray he may be excused from answering any question which may tend
to affect or injure himself.
A debate ensured for near an hour, whether he may or may be allowed the
privilege.
The Solicitor-General very strenuously asserts, that in the present case he
may not be allowed it.

Serjeant Glynn, and the Recorder, reply to him.
The Lord Chief Justice gives it as his opinion, that the man is not bound to
answer to any matter which may tend to accuse himself.
The report then drops a footnote to the nemo tenetur siepsum accusaremaxim.

1626

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

The second example comes from Blackstone, a primary source of
legal knowledge for the framers. According to Blackstone, a
prospective juror in a civil case "may be examined on oath... with
regard to such causes or challenges as are not to his dishonour or
discredit; but not with regard to any crime, or any thing which tends
to his disgrace or disadvantage."3 "5
The third example is Marbury v. Madison.3 6 The Supreme
Court itself inquired into what had become of Marbury's commission.
Levi Lincoln, Attorney General of the United States, who may have
destroyed the commission himselfl objected to being sworn as a
witness, both on grounds of executive privilege and on grounds of
self-incrimination. The Court agreed that he "was not obliged to state
anything which would criminate himself."3 '
Prospective jurors and witnesses in civil cases, then, could avail
themselves of the privilege. Courts did not compel them to answer
on condition that their testimony not later be used against them, still
less with the proviso that fruits could be used. Indeed, it seems that
the primary role for the privilege was to protect individuals from
being questioned upon oath in proceedings other than criminal trials.
Again, in criminal trials, the accused could not be sworn at all, but
was constantly giving information, if not evidence, in the course of
conducting the defense.
Why then does the amendment's text confine the privilege to
"any criminal case"? Madison's draft provided only that no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; the "criminal case"
language was added with little explanation.3"
One possible
rationale was to avoid creating a right against compelled discovery of
books and papers in civil cases, but there is no clear proof of the
motive behind the change. 0 There is certainly no suggestion that
the text was designed to constitutionalize a narrower privilege against
311
self-incrimination than the one recognized under prevailing law.
305. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *364.

306. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 140 (1803).

307. See LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGMENTS 275 (1972).
308. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 144.
309. See Levy, supra note 300, at 251; Moglen, supra note 295, at 1122-23.
310. See Levy, supra note 300, at 424-27.
311. See STORY, supra note 39, § 931, at 662-63 (Fifth Amendment "is but an
affirmance of a common-law privilege"); 3 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 3102-03
(1st ed. 1904) ("But this constitutional sanction, being merely a recognition and not a new
creation, has not altered the tenor and scope of the privilege; it has merely given greater
permanence to the traditional rule handed down to us." (footnote omitted)); Levy, supra

note 300, at 427-32. Judge Friendly believed that restricting the privilege to criminal trials
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A "case" ' in any event is not necessarily identical to a
"prosecution."312
The Sixth Amendment uses the latter term, in
dealing specifically with the criminal trial. The Fifth Amendment, by
contrast, contains a miscellany of rights, some against criminal and
some against civil liabilities." We speak routinely of police investigators working on a case before they have a suspect. If we think of
we can square the text of the
a "case" as a potential "prosecution"
314
Fifth Amendment with its history.
was inconsistent with both history and policy:
For one thing, it would omit the witness before a legislative investigation,
although John Lilburne's encounter in 1645 with the House of Commons'
Committee on Investigation, which has been wittily called "a sort of House
Committee for the Investigation of Un-English Activities," was one of the most
famous chapters in the history of the privilege. Colonial assemblies also had
recognized the privilege in their own investigations. Furthermore, once the
amendment was read to cover the mere witness in a criminal case, it seemed
irrational not to apply it to the witness in a civil trial. Madison's original version
had read simply "nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself"; the
limiting phrase "in any criminal case" was proposed by John Laurence, a
Federalist Representative from New York, and was adopted without comment
even from Madison. Whatever Laurence's purposes may have been, the courts
have long read the clause to mean what it said before his qualifying amendment.
Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor ConstitutionalChange,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 676-77 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
312. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892):
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can only be,
that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal
prosecution against himself. It would doubtless cover such cases; but it is not
limited to them. The object was to insure that a person should not be compelled,
when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend
to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to
criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.
Id.at 562.
313. See id. at 563 ("A criminal prosecution under article 6 of the amendments is much
narrower than a 'criminal case,' under article 5 of the amendments.").
314. Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 910 n.229, invoke Article III
to argue that a " 'case' begins when a prosecutor or plaintiff files an indictment or
complaint." I think the equation of the Fifth Amendment and Article III extremely
unlikely; the provisions were adopted at different times for different purposes. Whatever
the meaning of "cases" in Article III, limiting the Fifth Amendment to post-indictment
questioning would mean that both oaths or torture could be used before indictment. The
only founding-era limit on using such statements at trial would have been the confessions
rule, not the privilege. Moreover, cases like Marbury recognizing the privilege for thirdparty witnesses clearly disregarded the limited reading of "case" that Amar and Lettow
propose.
In any event, Amar and Lettow contradict their definition of "case" when they say
earlier that "[p]retrial, a suspect under our scheme must comply with all judicially
authorized depositions, inquests, and subpoenas." Id. Logically, their definition of "case"
calls for cutting off compelled questioning at the time of indictment-the same arbitrary
line drawn for Sixth Amendment purposes in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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This reading meshes perfectly with the known history; a witness,
whether a prosecution witness at a criminal trial, or before a
legislative tribunal, or in a civil proceeding, could claim a privilege not
to make a criminal case against himself under oath. Given the
ubiquity of pretrial examination of the accused, the ban on sworn
testimony by the defendant at trial, and the textual reference to "any"
criminal case, reading "case" as "prosecution" leads to the odd
conclusion that the only people the framers meant to protect with the
privilege were third-party witnesses at criminal trials. That seems like
an enormously unlikely scenario.
As a conventionalist rather than an originalist, I admit that an
unintended interpretation might be valid if some other species of
constitutional authority, or some really overwhelming policy consideration, supported that interpretation. But the text is ambiguous,
and history and precedent are quite clear that the privilege can be
claimed in any proceeding.3" The practical effect of the privilege,
when claimed, was use-plus-fruits immunity.
Amar and Lettow embrace the pre-Counselman nineteenth
century cases, exemplified by People v. Kelly, 16 that accepted
testimonial-immunity statutes as constitutional. By that period,
defense lawyers had entered the criminal process in force and the
privilege had become a serious impediment to law enforcement. The
testimonial-immunity approach thus sheds no light on the Fifth
Amendment, although it might regarding the Fourteenth. This
approach was unanimously rejected in Counselman,1 7 and again
repudiated in Kastigar,18 so that from a conventional viewpoint
reviving testimonial immunity faces an uphill fight, and depends on
accommodating immunity so limited with the underlying purposes of
the privilege.
This cannot be done. Imagine a drug dealer sworn as a witness
and asked: "Where is your stash?" If the privilege is based on the

Evidently, Amar and Lettow equate "case" with trial-but that can't be right, because in
1789 the accused could not be sworn as a witness at trial.
315. By way of precedent, see Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920) (civil
proceedings); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (police interrogation); Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (administrative proceedings);

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury proceedings); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 140, 144 (1803) (appellate proceedings).
316. 24 N.Y. 74 (1861). Kelly is a companion case to People v. Hackley, which is the
title case in the New York reports. The case has always been cited as Kelly.

317. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562.
318. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449-59 (1972).
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temptation of oath-breaking and the consequence of damnation, there
is no difference in such a case between testimonial immunity and
compelled testimony at the trial itself. An honest answer leads
straight to jail; a dishonest one straight to hell.
On the other hand, if the privilege is based on -the temptation of
the questioner to resort to brutality, the case is again the same. If the
police can get an honest answer about the location of the stash, they
will have their case if they can prove independently that the suspect
had access to the drugs. In any case involving physical evidence, drug
cases especially, they will be as tempted to coerce a pretrial confession as they were in the days of the third degree. 19
Even on the reliability theory, which I reject, the cases are
indistinguishable. A suspect might very well be the innocent
custodian of physical evidence. Thus the practical jeopardy of the
witness remains, and whatever unreliability stems from jeopardy
would also remain. It is no answer to say that the physical evidence
is reliable; sure, the white powder tests positive for cocaine, but who
had possession? Sure, the ballistics test shows the pistol registered to
the witness is the murder weapon-but did he pull the trigger? An
innocent person with a genuine but improbable defense would know
that honest answers might lead to his conviction.
Thus both innocent and guilty have motive to lie when compelled
to testify about physical evidence. Amar and Lettow would exclude
the testimony but admit the fruits, but on their theory fruits will
rarely be discovered because the testimony is unreliable. The one

319. Wigmore, in defending use-only immunity, seemed to assume that the discovery
of derivative evidence would be a coincidence:
By this interpretation the relation between the main crime and the fact
"tending to criminate" is not a logical and inherent one, i.e., that of a legal whole
to its parts, but a casual and external one, i.e., a relation consisting in the
probability that the one fact will so stimulate the ingenuity and fit the resources
of certain prosecuting officials that they will be enabled thereby to discover the
other fact, which otherwise, with the same ingenuity and resources, would have

remained undiscovered by them. The thought of making an important rule of
law turn upon so casual, ephemeral, and unmeasurable a test as this was never
entertained, and could not have, by so wholesome a thinker as Chief Justice
Marshall. It was reserved for latter-day Courts, who treated the privilege with

morbid delicacy, and were disposed to expand it into misty attenuation, to resort
to this meaning.... Counselman v. Hitchcock ... is heterodox and unsound.
4 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2261, at 3121 (1st ed. 1904). Given Wigmore's view of
the privilege's purpose-to prevent the system from resorting to extorted confessions-this
is the only way to defend use-only immunity, for if the questioner and the suspect both
know that the answer to the question will have the effect of proving guilt, the temptation
to brutality is as strong as ever.
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substantial gain that could come from pretrial depositions is eliciting
false testimony that can be used at the trial, but this they are
unwilling to do.
We might measure the consistency of the Amar/Lettow approach
with the Fifth Amendment by asking how John Lilburne's cases would
have come out under their theory."2 Lilburne, it will be recalled,
was twice tried for criminal libel based on authorship of political
tracts. Amar and Lettow would have permitted him to be questioned
in full before trial. They would not permit use of the answer to the
question, "Are you the author of An Impeachment of High Treason
against Oliver Cromwell?" But other questions would be asked:
"With whom did you contract to print An Impeachment? Where can
we find the printer? How many copies of that contract are there?
Where are they?" And so Lilburne would have faced the dilemma of
swearing falsely or convicting himself. Any interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment that permits this result is suspect.
As for precedent, I think Professor Kamisar has shown that the
Court's receptivity toward the fruits of Mirandaviolations should not
be understood as receptivity to the fruits of compulsion by formal
process.321 Indeed, I think Professor Kamisar understates his case,
for the Court has strongly suggested that evidence derived from compelled statements is inadmissible. In New Jersey v. Portash,the Court
held that immunized pretrial testimony could not be used to impeach
the defendant's trial testimony.3" New Jersey's position was not
that the compelled pretrial statements could be used for the truth of
the matter asserted. The state accepted the privilege's bar on any

320. On Lilburne's trials, see Levy, supra note 300, at 266-300; Harold W. Wolfram,
John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillarof Fire,3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213 (1952).
321. See Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions,
and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 968-75, 1008-09 (1995). In their reply,
Amar and Lettow fall back from precedent to text and history. See Akhil Reed Amar &
Renee B. Lettow, Self-Incriminationand the Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder to Professor
Kamisar, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1011 (1995).
322. 440 U.S. 450 (1979). Professor Kamisar quite rightly notes that Portash expressly
recognized a distinction between statements obtained in violation of Miranda and
statements obtained by compulsion through formal process. See Kamisar, supra note 321,
at 975. My point, however, is that in Portash the Court rejected the use of compelled
testimony for a nontestimonial purpose, just as if the government had offered a compelled
hand-written statement incriminating the suspect in robbery as a handwriting exemplar to
prove that the suspect had written the ransom note in an unrelated kidnapping case.
Although verbal in form, the evidence excluded in Portash was not-at least not
technically-testimonial.
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such use.3 What the government sought to do with the statements
was only to prove that the defendant/witness told different stories at
different times and was therefore unworthy of belief.
Given the purpose for which they were offered, the statements
in Portash could not have been unreliable; theoretically, they were no
more testimonial than the blood sample in Schmerber. The tag line
for impeachment with such statements is: "Were you lying then, or
are you lying now?" The impeaching party doesn't care which answer
the jury favors. The statements are relevant so long as they were
made, whether or not they were true.
There, is of course, the risk that the jury would disregard the
limiting instruction. But there is nothing in Portash to suggest that
this was any concern for the Court. Indeed, the Court explicitly
disdained any concern for reliability: "The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide a privilege against compelled3 self-incrimination,
not merely against unreliable self-incrimination."1l
The Court's refusal is no more than fidelity to the privilege.
There is nothing inherently suspect about compelled self-destructive
testimony. Civil defendants facing massive damage awards, or losing
custody of their children, must answer adverse questions under oath.
No one distrusts the jury's ability to evaluate such testimony.
Professor Schulhofer has attempted to rehabilitate the reliability
account of the privilege.3 He claims that "the privilege helps many
innocent defendants and that acquitting these innocents is more
important than convicting an equal or somewhat larger number of
guilty defendants.",31 One could say the same thing for a rule that
bars the testimony of prosecution witnesses whose last names begin
with the letter R. This rule would help innocent and guilty alike. If
the defendant is really guilty, surely the prosecutor can find some
witnesses with other names. Since preventing unjust conviction is
more important than enabling just conviction, the R-witness rule is
justifiable.

323. Brief for Petitioner at 30, Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (No. 77-1489) ("While not
admissible to prove the accused's guilt, petitioner submits that prior immunized testimony
should be admissible to impeach the accused's materially inconsistent trial testimony.").
324. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459.
325. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination,26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311,319,325-33 (1991). Professor Schulhofer also relies
on the tendency of the privilege to prevent inhumane police interrogation, an important

point against Amar and Lettow's account, which would permit police questioning aiming
for physical fruits. Id.
326. Id at 329.
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That is not, of course, what it means to say that compelled selfincriminating testimony is unreliable. That claim means something
more than the claim that "the privilege, as a revolution or an
earthquake, might protect the innocent." 3" It doesn't mean that
compelling the defendant to testify would cause erroneous verdicts
(permitting witnesses to testify whose last names start with R will
cause some erroneous verdicts). It means that in the cases in which
compelled testimony would determine the outcome, compulsion would
cause an unacceptable proportion of erroneous verdicts. That might
be so in one of two ways. Testifying might permit the introduction of
impeachment material that has a tendency to cause a decision on an
irrational basis, such as prior convictions or past acts of dishonesty.
Alternatively, the accused might be an ineffective witness.
To justify the privilege on the ground that the impeachment rules
are irrational is to let the tail wag the dog. The principal reason why
defendants refuse to take the stand is that they fear impeachment
with prior convictions-a fear with strong support from the empirical
evidence.32 If the impeachment rule were abolished, either by
excluding the convictions for impeachment purposes or by admitting
them in the government's case in chief, the most plausible reason for
the innocent defendant to stand silent would disappear.
More generally, impeaching evidence-prior inconsistent
statements, past acts of dishonesty, and so on-ought to be admitted
to impeach only when their probative value outweighs their potential
for prejudice. So long as the rules governing impeachment make
sense, compelling the defendant to testify does not run a risk of
irrational verdicts.
That leaves the ineffective witness scenario. The defendant might
truthfully testify to innocence in an incredible manner, or foolishly
choose to tell a false exculpatory story instead of a true one. The
framers didn't seem to think much of this risk, for they relied on the
"accused speaks" model for their own criminal procedure. The risk
is surely less today given the ubiquity of defense counsel. But the
fundamental point is that the "truth is consistent with itself, and every

327. Dripps, supra note 94, at 715.
328. See HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 161 (Phoenix ed.
1971) (in cases in which the jury learned that the defendant has no prior record, the
conviction rate fell from 42% to 25%).
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one who
is speaking the truth can tell in the main a straight
32 9
story.

Even if the privilege does protect some innocent, ineffective
witnesses from unjust conviction, its price is still high. Not only, as
Amar and Lettow rightly stress, does the privilege pose a bar to the
innocent

defendant

seeking third-party

testimony,330

but

the

availability of the privilege in court has driven the interrogation of the
suspect to the police station.33 All of the claimed defects of
testimony in court while represented by counsel pale into insignificance with the defects of secret questioning by the police.
The suspect may be drunk, high, injured, or exhausted; he will
certainly be frightened. When a court decides what the suspect said,
and under what pressures, it will decide on the basis of the testimony
given by the police. Even if a system of in-court questioning caused
the convictions of innocent people, which I doubt, it would cause far
fewer such convictions than the police interrogation which the
privilege perpetuates. 332 And, while the present system subjects the
poor and ignorant to unregulated questioning by the police, it permits
professional spokesmen, such as Oliver North and O.J. Simpson, to
give no evidence at all-even though neither could be impeached with
prior convictions.
If the risk of false convictions stemming from in-court testimony
were thought to be greater than I believe it to be, measures far short
of the privilege could protect the truth-finding function. For example,
the accused might be compelled to answer written interrogatories,
through counsel, before trial. Or the court, as opposed to the
prosecutor, could conduct the examination of the defendant. Or a
privilege conditioned on a showing of testimonial deficiencies might
be developed. Many measures are possible, but the absence of any
such measures on the civil side suggests that testimony compelled
against interest is generally reliable.
Amar and Lettow seem to believe this, for they suppose that
compelled pretrial examination would commonly lead to the discovery
of admissible, reliable fruits. If compelled testimony were unreliable,
it shouldn't be counted on to turn up much fruit. If compelled
329. Henry T. Terry, ConstitutionalProvisions Against ForcingSelf-Incrimination, 15
YALE L.J. 127, 127 (1906).
330. Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 861.
331. On the role of the privilege in fostering police interrogation, see sources cited in
Dripps, supra note 94, at 714 n.62.
332. For cases of false conviction due to confessions extracted during police
interrogation, see MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY 75-95 (1991).
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testimony does turn up reliable fruit, the testimony that led to the
fruits is no less reliable than the fruits themselves.333
That is why, as Amar and Lettow rightly acknowledge, 334
formal questioning in court should replace informal questioning at the
police station.3 Under their system, however, the typical defendant
would simply lie at the pretrial examination rather than take a
contempt sanction. The typical defendant certainly would not disclose
the location of physical evidence that might hang him at trial. Subsequently, even if the prosecution can disprove the pretrial testimony,
it would be barred by Amar's and Lettow's account of the privilege
from using it at trial.
Just as now, the window between arrest and the arrival of
defense counsel would continue to supply the only practical opportunity to get evidence from the suspect. But under the Amar/Lettow
model, physical evidence derived from the police interrogation would
be admissible, no matter how coercive the questioning. And they are
strangely agnostic about when even verbal admissions extracted by the
police would, or would not, be admissible at trial.336 Amar and
Lettow characterize police abuse as a Fourth Amendment
violation,337 but that takes us back to Amar's hostility to the
exclusionary rule and his enthusiasm for damage actions.
Given the proportion of cases that involve physical
evidence-murder weapons, robbery booty, and above all,
drugs-their proposal would vastly increase the incentive to coerce
confessions. The admissibility of fruits would nullify the privilege's
practical value as an antidote to the traditional abuses of police

333. Corroboration with independent evidence may not be thought to establish the
reliability of a statement. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990). But when a
statement causes the discovery of the physical evidence, the case is better described as a
case of guilty knowledge than a case of a corroborated admission.
334. Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 904.
335. For various proposals for in-court interrogation, see WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE
SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 31-56 (1967); Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the
Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932); Roscoe Pound,
Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 1014 (1934).

336. Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 908-09.
337. Id. at 927 ("[Tjhe root antitorture idea is largely a Fourth Amendment idea and

not a Fifth Amendment idea"); cf STORY, supra note 39, § 931, at 662-63 (stating that the
Fifth Amendment privilege "is but an affirmance of a common-law privilege. But it is of

inestimable value. It is well known, that in some countries, not only are criminals
compelled to give evidence against themselves, but are subjected to the rack or torture in
order to procure a confession of guilt.").
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interrogation, while enough of the privilege would survive to prevent
replacing police interrogation with in-court questioning.
The privilege is at best an anachronism and at worst a
constitutional blunder. But it's in the Constitution, and the courts are
bound to apply it. Amar and Lettow stand in the Wigmore tradition
of strangling the privilege through restrictive interpretation. A more
honest and more successful attack on the privilege would be to return
to Twining and Adamson, thereby freeing the states to experiment
with meaningful forms of in-court pretrial questioning. Another
alternative, less honest and less effective, would be to overrule Griffin
v. California,so that the suspect could be given a strong reason to tell
his story at a pretrial hearing. But even that approach would be more
faithful to the privilege than the Amar/Lettow account.
III. UP FROM INCORPORATION
So: I think Amar is wrong about constitutional theory, wrong
about incorporation, wrong about the Fourth Amendment, and that
Amar and Lettow are wrong about the Fifth Amendment. Yet in
another and more general way, I think Amar is right about criminal
procedure. Professors Maclin,338 Steiker,339 and Kamisar
all
make cogent points against one or another of Amar's claims, and I
agree with most of what those critics have to say, so far as it goes.
But what Amar's critics have said doesn't go very far. They each
object to some aspects of prevailing doctrine, but they do not
acknowledge the arbitrary quality of the entire regime of constitutional
criminal procedure. The Court decides criminal procedure cases as
though it had some common-law supervisory power over criminal
justice. Neither the text nor history nor precedent seems to count for
much. Not surprisingly, cases decided without consulting any general
principle abound with inconsistencies and uncertainties.
The principle reason for this state of affairs is the incorporation
doctrine. Harlan was right and Black was wrong; the "specific
guarantees" of the Bill have not survived the countervailing pressure
of policy. Nor is the Bill, standing alone, enough to secure decent
police methods and fair trials
Oddly, the proof of this thesis comes from Amar's own work.
What makes Amar's work interesting is his rhetorical cunning, the

338. See Macin, supra note 210.
339. See Steiker, supra note 211.
340. See Kamisar, supra note 321.
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ability to rehabilitate lost causes, such as the incorporation doctrine,
tort alternatives to the exclusionary rule, and the reliability theory of
the privilege. Not surprisingly, his most brilliant arguments turn out
to be wrong. 34' But their failure is highly instructive.
Amar acutely realizes that orginalism is politically bankrupt,
absent some contemporary source of obligation to the framers'
intentions. He responds not by abandoning originalism (which would
not be brilliant but merely reasonable) and concocts a political theory
founded on popular knowledge of the possibility of extra-textual
amendment. Subtract the unconvincing but brilliant argument, and
originalism becomes by Amar's admission only "the dead hand of the
past."' 4
Amar acutely realizes that the case for incorporation is badly
damaged by the Twitchell case. He responds not by abandoning
incorporation (which would not be brilliant, but merely reasonable),
but instead by arguing that Twitchell's due process claim proves that
all nine justices were in a complete funk that day. Subtract the daring
but incredible argument, and, by Amar's own admission, Fairman,
and Berger have a "trump card" to play with a
Frankfurter,
343
"flourish.

Amar acutely realizes that most criticism of the exclusionary rule
is really criticism of the Fourth Amendment. He responds not by
defending the exclusionary rule (which would not be brilliant, but
merely reasonable), but by creating a gap between the Fourth
Amendment right and the exclusionary remedy in his rousing "cops
Subtract the passionate but
get lucky, conspirators rat" passage.'
demonstrably false argument, and, by Amar's own admission, "setting
itsel, and not of
criminals free is a cost of the Fourth Amendment
345
the much-maligned exclusionary rule.
Amar and Lettow acutely realize that the traditional justifications
for the Fifth Amendment privilege are pious nonsequiturs. They
respond not by opposing the privilege (which would... well, by now
you get the point), but rather by attempting to rehabilitate the
reliability theory of the privilege. Subtract this counterfactual and
incomplete response, and by their own admission the justifications for

341. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance,70 MINN. L. RpV. 917, 917
(1986) (arguing that "brilliance" should count heavily against an economic or legal theory).
342. Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited, supra note 82, at 1072.
343. Amar, FourteenthAmendment, supra note 19, at 1255.
344. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 15, at 794.

345. Id. at 793-94 (footnote omitted).
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the privilege either "prove[] too much or too little (or both)" or are
"simply wrongheaded." 3 6
Amar's critics have focused on one or another of his clever
innovations, not on the underlying motivation for those intellectual
maneuvers. I agree that his innovations are failures; but their
motivation is fundamentally sound. Constitutional criminal procedure
is a mass of contradictions; the founders can give us neither obligatory
nor even plausible guidance on most of our problems; and the
contradictions in the cases make reliance on precedent problematic.
This would be a poor prognosis even for state commercial law, which
frees no murderers and imprisons no innocents, and which can be
reformed by statute. For a body of law theoretically founded on the
written Constitution of a republic, meant to govern the moral
dilemmas of crime and punishment, the situation borders on disgrace.
The way out of the predicament will not be easy. But if the
Court would readopt due process as the dominant idea in criminal
procedure, and recharacterize due process in procedural rather than
substantive terms, 47 things would begin to improve. "Fundamental
fairness" applied on a case-by-case basis is no doctrine at all, certainly
not a doctrine with any roots in the Constitution. But preventing
punishment outside the criminal process, and ensuring that the
criminal process does all it can to prevent unjust convictions, are the
core ideas of due process of law. If the Court would implement those
ideas by promulgating general standards, it could avoid the vacuous
generality of fundamental fairness and the arbitrary particularity of
incorporation.
Much, probably most, current law should survive. Arbitrary
searches and seizures deprive people of liberty without due process,
for it is the prospect of a valid prosecution that justifies coercive
methods of investigation. But due process could go further than the
Fourth Amendment, regulating such practices as the planting of spies
and the collection of information confided to third parties, because
"liberty" is a more expansive concept than privacy. If the
exclusionary rule is the only practical way to enforce the ban on
unreasonable search and arrest, then the exclusionary rule is
constitutionally justified as well. Police questioning, with its sinister
secrecy and history of abuse, is likewise vulnerable to due process

346. Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment, supra note 16, at 889-90.
347. For the outlines of this approach, see Dripps, supra note 95, at 618-20.
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challenge-a challenge that has a good chance of success, once
nonviolent, public questioning in court gains constitutional sanction.
Due process, moreover, can do far more than the Bill of Rights
to make trials fair. If police investigation focuses on a single suspect
and fails to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, then the trial
becomes an appeal from the investigation and due process is violated.
If the government is allowed to prove odious but irrelevant prior acts
by the accused, so that the jury might convict against the evidence,
due process again is violated. If the accused offers probative,
exculpatory testimony, whether from experts or from persons with
first-hand knowledge, the due process right to a fair trial requires
admitting the evidence.
Professor Amar, by contrast, has little to say about due process.
The double jeopardy article he wrote with Jonathan Marcus describes
the underlying principles of due process as "protecting innocent
' and the text of
persons and checking government overreaching,"348
the Due Process Clause as "more spacious-but also more flexible,
less absolute"349 than that of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Yet the
double jeopardy article also makes clear that, for Amar, due process
functions as a gap-filler, something resorted to when the Bill of Rights
permits a really troubling result.
Amar's thought is drawn primarily to the Bill of Rights, with its
legalistic text and its revered history. His commitment to incorporation is at the least not compelled by conventional sources of
constitutional law, and it leads him to both misunderstand current law
and to chart a deeply mistaken course for the future.
Even if his statist readings of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
were valid, due process makes those interpretations of questionable
relevance. A robust concern for "protecting innocent persons and
preventing government overreaching," such as I endorse, would lead
to a residential warrant requirement, an exclusionary rule, and a
proscription on evidentiary use of statements obtained during police
interrogation. Given Bill of Rights minimalism, defense lawyers
would resort to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments. Without an account of the role those clauses play in
search-and-seizure and interrogation, Professor Amar's entire program
remains unclear.

348. Amar & Marcus, supra note 18, at 29 (footnote omitted).
349. Id. at 31.
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As against the federal government the Bill of Rights of course
applies, so the claims I developed about the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments would remain relevant even in a regime that, in state
cases, focused on due process. Due process, however, is itself part of
the Bill of Rights, so that any due process rights that go beyond the
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments' particular provisions would also
run against the federal government.
The Court resorted to incorporation thirty years ago as a
response to the manifest defects of criminal justice in the states and
the manifest failure of the fundamental fairness regime to do much
about the situation. But there was nothing magical about the
incorporation doctrine, just as due process can mean something both
more specific and more closely connected to constitutional text and
history than fundamental fairness. Given a constitutional ban on
punishment without trial, and a constitutional requirement that trials
be fair, criminal procedure would at last be on the road to a principled and coherent body of doctrine.
When it comes to
constitutional criminal procedure, our first principle should be due
process.

